Fordham Law Review
Volume 80

Issue 2

Article 15

November 2011

Timing Is Everything: Markets, Loss, and Proof of Causation in
Fraud on the Market Actions
Andrew M. Erdlen

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew M. Erdlen, Timing Is Everything: Markets, Loss, and Proof of Causation in Fraud on the Market
Actions, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 877 (2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss2/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

TIMING IS EVERYTHING:
MARKETS, LOSS, AND PROOF OF CAUSATION
IN FRAUD ON THE MARKET ACTIONS
Andrew M. Erdlen*
Plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions must prove that defendants’
misconduct caused the investors’ losses. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. reaffirmed that loss
causation is a quintessential merits issue that must be decided at trial. In
three recent trials, juries have held defendants liable with findings of fact
that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework for
securities fraud causation. This Note examines these verdicts and
encourages the courts to depart from the common law of fraud and tighten
the meaning of causation. To do this, courts must adhere to the economic
theory that sustains modern class actions. Because losing parties will
invariably move for post-trial relief, courts should develop rules that
incorporate conceptual clarity and well-defined mechanisms of proof.
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INTRODUCTION
In its most recent pronouncement on causation in securities fraud, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs do not need to prove loss causation
as a prerequisite to class certification.1 Instead, the Court reaffirmed that
loss causation, which “requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation
that affected the integrity of the market price also caused a subsequent
economic loss,” 2 is a quintessential merits issue. The unanimous Court
repudiated the Fifth Circuit’s approach to loss causation, 3 but the decision
did not address problematic issues of proof that emerged following several
recent mega-trials. Causation played a prominent role in each of these
verdicts, and because of its conceptual sophistication, it is an intensely
litigated issue. This Note argues that loss causation is the overriding issue
in securities class actions, and it suggests some conceptual guidelines for
1. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
2. Id. at 2186.
3. See id.
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courts to consider when ruling on post-trial issues of proof. This Note
urges the courts to develop bright-line rules requiring plaintiffs to identify
the mechanisms that reveal the truth of concealed fraud to the markets.
This Note focuses on class actions, the most prominent remedy for
aggrieved investors. Class actions brought pursuant to the federal securities
laws have astonishing economic impact, and have been referred to as the
“800-pound gorilla” dwarfing all other class actions. 4 These claims
typically arise under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345
(‘34 Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 6
(Rule 10b-5), the predominant antifraud provisions of the federal regulatory
scheme. 7 This framework permits plaintiffs to sue the issuers of securities
for disseminating false or misleading public statements that cause economic
loss. 8 Courts fashioned an implied private right of action from Section
10(b) of the ‘34 Act, and shaped its contours with principles of common
law fraud. 9 Securities class actions differ from common law fraud,
however, and feature special rules.10
Because Rule 10b-5 broadly proscribes fraudulent conduct, it is the most
robust legal remedy available to investors.11 Since 1996, plaintiffs have
filed more than 3200 securities class actions in the federal courts. 12 These
actions have massive economic consequences. From 1997 through 2009,
corporate class action defendants have lost a total annual average of $133
billion in market capitalization following the final corrective disclosure of
4. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1539 (2006); see also Ann Morales
Olazábal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 337, 339 (2006) (characterizing the securities fraud class action as a
“viciously fought ‘money race’”).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
7. See 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 12.3[1], at 518–19 (6th ed. 2009).
8. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339 (2005).
9. See generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[3], at 522–29; infra Part I.A. The
courts have read the elements of common law fraud into Rule 10b-5 claims. See Dura, 544
U.S. at 342 (requiring loss causation); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232, 243 (1988)
(requiring reliance and materiality); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74
(1977) (requiring deception and manipulation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
212–14 (1976) (requiring scienter, a wrongful mental state). An omission is material if
“‘there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important.’” Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 439 (1976)).
10. Securities class actions differ from common law misrepresentation and deceit
actions, and securities laws were partially designed to supplement common law remedies.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–44, 244 n.22 (“The modern securities markets, literally involving
millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions
contemplated by early fraud cases . . . .”).
11. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 520–21.
12. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN
REVIEW 3 (2011), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/df1151e6-dee6-447aa125-6e5ced949877/Presentation/NewsAttachment/789fd0d2-16c4-4bdc-b29dbc0f4ed9c622/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2010_YIR.pdf. This total is current through
December 31, 2010. Id.
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class periods. 13 This loss in market capitalization does not easily translate
into a measure of damages that plaintiffs could recover in subsequent
litigation, however. 14 Determining damages across lengthy class periods is
a far more challenging endeavor, and a conceptual focus of this Note. 15
The Supreme Court directly addressed loss causation before Halliburton.
In a 2005 decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Court
unanimously held that overpaying for a stock that was distorted by fraud is
not sufficient to plead the element of loss causation.16 A mere drop in stock
price following the revelation of a concealed truth is insufficient to establish
loss causation. 17 The Court held that there must be a “causal connection
between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” 18 As the Court
observed, drops in stock price can be caused by any number of factors, and
fraud is only one of them. 19
While the Dura decision provided the lower courts with some guidance,
the decision only addressed pleading standards; courts continue to struggle
with loss causation’s standard of proof. 20 In addition to proving that the
investor purchased the security at a distorted price, courts interpret Dura to
require plaintiffs to prove not only that the stock price declined after the
truth made its way to the marketplace, but that the decline was not a result
of some factor other than fraud. 21 Courts have recognized various theories
of proof that allegations of fraud actually and proximately caused losses.22
Expert testimony plays the critical role in establishing causal links; the
strength of an expert’s damages model can determine the survival of a
plaintiff’s case. 23 These requirements raise difficult issues of proof, making
loss causation one of the most heavily litigated issues in modern securities
fraud. 24
13. See id. at 2 (using the disclosure dollar loss method to estimate the impact of
information revealed at the end of the class period).
14. See id. at 24.
15. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 349–50 (2007) (“[N]o coherent doctrinal statement
exists . . . .”); see also infra Part II.D.
16. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) (rejecting the
“purchase price inflation” theory previously endorsed by the Ninth Circuit).
17. Id. at 342.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 343 (“Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone permits
us to say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a
future loss.”); see infra Part III (discussing the various factors that impact the market price of
a security).
20. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339; see also Merritt B. Fox,
After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 865–66 (2006)
(discussing causation issues undecided by Dura).
21. See infra Part III; see also Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–43.
22. See infra Part III; see also David Tabak, Inflation and Damages in a Post-Dura
World 1–3 (Nat’l Econ. Research Assoc., Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017334 (discussing inflation modeling
methodologies).
23. See Robert Pietrzak & Daniel A. McLaughlin, Loss Causation Experts After Dura,
LAW360 (May 21, 2009), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/99821.
24. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339.
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Though few securities class actions proceed to trial, 25 several recent
verdicts produced results that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Dura. 26 This Note encourages the lower courts to fashion rules
that prevent conflicts between the economic theory supporting the Supreme
Court’s class action and causation jurisprudence, and mechanisms of proof.
This Note begins by examining the essential tools that inform the causation
analysis. Part I considers the history and remedial purpose of the federal
securities laws. Part I then focuses on the history of the causation element,
the economic theory underlying proof of loss causation, and the
maintenance of class actions. Part II addresses the Supreme Court’s
causation decisions in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 27 Dura, and Halliburton.
Those three decisions provide the legal framework for the causation
analysis; this Note next examines more practical considerations. In Part III,
this Note discusses the evidentiary aspects of loss causation. Part IV of this
Note urges the courts to tighten the loss causation analysis to remain
consistent with the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework.
Since causation and damages are inextricable, jury verdicts must not
depart from the expert testimony proffered at trial. These results do not
further the goals of the securities laws, and more directed efforts to
streamline the process should yield more accurate verdicts. When deciding
post-trial motions, the courts should rely on the economic theory supporting
the class device as guide to proof of causation. Courts should reject
verdicts in favor of parties that do not put forth sufficient evidence
connecting investor losses to disclosures that initially distort market price
with those disclosures that reveal the nature of the fraud to the market. This
25. Only eleven securities fraud class actions have reached jury verdicts based on
conduct occurring after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See
Adam T. Savett, Securities Class Action Trials Post-PSLRA Era (Sept. 19, 2011), available
at http://www.box.net/shared/xxav75dzpf.
26. The jury entered a mixed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in Lawrence E. Jaffe
Pension Plan v. Household International, Inc. on May 7, 2009. 756 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930
(N.D. Ill. 2010); see also Kevin LaCroix, Plaintiffs Prevail in Mixed Jury Verdict in
Household International Securities Fraud Trial, D&O DIARY (May 7, 2009),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/05/articles/securities-litigation/plaintiffs-prevail-in-mixedjury-verdict-in-household-international-securities-fraud-trial/. The jury entered a plaintiffs’
verdict in In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation on January 29, 2010. 765 F.
Supp. 2d 512, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Nathan Koppel, Viva Vivendi! New York
Plaintiffs’ Firms Score Huge Verdict, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2010, 5:31 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/29/viva-vivendi-new-york-plaintiffs-firms-score-hugeverdict/ (noting that damages could total $9 billion). Lastly, the Ninth Circuit restored a
plaintiffs’ verdict in In re Apollo Group, Inc. Securities Litigation that the district court had
vacated. No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988, at *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1602 (2011). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on two issues in that case—
whether a corrective disclosure must reveal new information, and the length of time in which
the market must respond to corrective information. Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policeman’s Annuity
& Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (denying certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
i, Apollo Grp., Inc. (Nov. 15, 2010) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *i; see also infra
Part III.E (discussing these verdicts). The jury in In re BankAtlantic Bancorp., Inc.
Securities Litigation returned a mixed verdict in favor of the defendants on November 10,
2010. See No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011); see also
infra notes 324, 337.
27. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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necessarily requires identification of the mechanism that revealed the fraud,
and proof that it caused a loss.
I. CAUSATION IN SECURITIES LAW: EARLY REGULATION, MARKET
EFFICIENCY, AND THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE
Loss causation evolved over many years. Since causation is essential to a
claim, it is important to understand the background of the securities laws
and the common law’s influence on private securities actions. This part
first reviews the history of the securities laws and examines the early loss
causation cases. It then examines the economic theory that eventually
allowed plaintiffs to overcome a longstanding hurdle to class certification.
These concepts coalesce into proof of causation by establishing the effect of
disclosure on the market price of a security, and thus the amount of
damages the fraudulent conduct caused.
A. The Realization of an Ancient Truth:
The Promulgation of the Federal Securities Laws
The federal securities laws are the product of our nation’s greatest
financial catastrophe—the Great Depression. 28 But the first calls for
securities regulation occurred during an economic crisis that took place over
twenty years before the October 1929 stock market crash. Following the
Panic of 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt implored Congress to remedy
egregious practices on Wall Street.29 Widespread abuses included the
manipulation of the price of securities to corner commodities markets.30
Despite investigations that exposed these corrupt practices, Congress failed
to enact any legislation after the Panic of 1907. 31
In the years leading up to the Great Depression, the stock markets grew
rapidly. 32 Trading became extremely profitable, and unsophisticated
investors playing the market conducted minimal investigation while
assuming massive risk. 33 In addition to the lingering problem of
speculation, 34 reformers suspected that brokers and underwriters distributed
28. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 407 (1990). The Panic of 1907 resulted from a loss of investor
confidence in New York banks following concern over the banks’ involvement in a market
manipulation scandal. See id. at 395.
29. See id. at 396. According to President Roosevelt, “There is no moral difference
between gambling at cards or in lotteries or on the race track and gambling in the stock
market.” Id. (quoting 42 CONG. REC. 1347, 1349 (1908)).
30. Id. at 399. Former New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes appointed a state
committee to investigate speculation in the market, defined at the time as “forecasting
changes of value and buying or selling in order to take advantage of them.” See id. at 397.
Rather than a deliberate, informed investment, the Hughes Committee focused on trading
activity “with a view to profiting from price changes.” Id.
31. See id. at 396–97 (“The government’s most important response to the panic was to
investigate.”).
32. See id. at 406–07.
33. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5–6 (6th
ed. 2009).
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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securities through false, opaque, or otherwise inadequate disclosures.35 A
significant portion of these transactions in securities were “on margin,”
where an investor borrows much of the stock’s purchase price. 36 When the
markets ultimately slowed down, lenders began calling debt. 37 Financially
strained investors sold securities en masse, depressing market prices.38 The
speculation bubble had burst; investor confidence disappeared, and the
markets soon failed. 39 Speculative trading, coupled with inadequate
diligence and poor disclosure, doomed Wall Street.40 These events
substantially caused the stock market crash of 1929 that kick-started the
Great Depression. 41
The congressional response to the 1929 crash primarily sought to prevent
another market meltdown. 42 Sensational investigations into Wall Street
practices exposed pervasive short-selling and price manipulation tactics.43
After the election of 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s incoming
administration urged remedial legislation.44 The proposed regulations
would have to balance the elimination of economically destructive behavior
with preserving investors’ ability to conduct free market transactions.45
Roosevelt introduced securities legislation that he hoped would restore the
“ancient truth” that market participants handling other people’s money are
trustees who must act in good faith. 46
Congress soon passed the Securities Act of 1933 47 (‘33 Act), which
regulated the distribution of securities by encouraging disclosure of
information pertinent to the investment.48 The ‘33 Act was premised on the
assumption that if stock prices are determined by public perception, and
public perception is clearer with thorough and accurate disclosure of
information about the issuer, securities legislation should strive to ensure
full and adequate disclosure. 49 Another legislative purpose of the ‘33 Act

35. See COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 6.
36. Id. at 5.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 5–6.
40. See id.
41. See id.; 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3], at 34.
42. See Thel, supra note 28, at 409.
43. See id. at 410–13.
44. See id. at 414–15.
45. See id. at 397–98.
46. See 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (message of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
47. 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)).
48. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][A], at 35–36. See generally Milton H. Cohen,
“Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966); John H. Walsh, A Simple
Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal Regulation of the
Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001) (providing a history of the purposes of
the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts).
49. See Thel, supra note 28, at 409.
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was to deter misconduct. 50 The ‘33 Act proscribed fraud in connection
with public offerings and provided remedies for purchasers of securities.51
Congress’s work was not done. The ‘34 Act followed, with much
broader protections for both purchasers and sellers.52 The ‘34 Act regulated
all aspects of trading on the marketplace, and imposed periodic disclosure
requirements on any company whose stock is listed on a national
exchange. 53 The ‘34 Act provided sweeping protections of investors
through a philosophy of mandatory disclosure. 54 To implement these
policies, Section 4(a) of the ‘34 Act created the SEC. 55 Section 10(b)
contains the ‘34 Act’s strongest antifraud provision 56 and affords the SEC
wide discretion to promulgate rules in furtherance of Section 10(b)’s
legislative purpose. 57
Section 10(b) ultimately provided the statutory basis for the modern
securities class action, though it contained no express right of action.58 In
1942, pursuant to its rulemaking authority conferred by Section 10(b), the
SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 as a general antifraud provision.59 Rule

50. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727–28 (1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); cf. Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 174 nn.9–10 (2008).
51. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 1340–41; see also 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][A],
at 36.
52. 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)); see
Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151; 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][B], at 36–37.
53. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][B], at 37–38.
54. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727–28; In re
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); H.R. REP.
NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
56. Section 10(b) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of . . . any
facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . .
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j.
57. See id.; 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.3, at 53.
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of
Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 65 (2004); see also Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729 (“Nor does the history of this provision provide any indication
that Congress considered the problem of private suits under it at the time of its passage.”).
Section 10(b)’s regulatory counterpart, Rule 10b-5, similarly contains no express right of
action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
59. Rule 10b-5 states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of . . . any facility or any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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10b-5’s reach extends to all misstatements made in connection with a
purchase or sale of a security. 60 The SEC did not originally envision the
rule to confer a private right of action,61 but courts have long held that Rule
10b-5 permits plaintiffs to sustain a claim for securities fraud. 62
Rule 10b-5 remains the most potent weapon of enforcement for a
securities plaintiff.63 Private actions promote the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts’
objectives of deterring corporate misconduct, as well as making whole
those who have been duped by corporate deceit.64 Since a private action
arising under Rule 10b-5 is a judicial creation, the courts initially defined its
elements of proof. 65 Plaintiffs asserting claims pursuant to Section 10(b) of
the ‘34 Act and Rule 10b-5 must prove six elements: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) damages; and (6) loss
causation, defined as a “causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss.” 66 This Note focuses on the causation
element, which was codified in 1995 67 but had its genesis in the common
law.
B. Loss Causation: The New Gatekeeper
Loss causation was first recognized as a distinct element of securities
fraud in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. in 1974. 68 Since then, loss
causation has presented conceptual difficulties that plague courts and
litigants. 69 Although it may be conceptually elusive, loss causation begins
when fraud drives a stock price above its intrinsic worth, and as a
consequence, a buyer overpays for the stock but is subsequently unable to
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 521.
60. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 630 (3d ed. 2009); 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 521.
61. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 630.
62. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see also
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
63. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 521 & n.24. Courts initially took a liberal
view of the implied right, but Supreme Court decisions beginning with Blue Chip Stamps
limited the scope of Rule 10b-5 claims. See 421 U.S. at 737 (noting that private Rule 10b-5
actions are a “judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). See
generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[3].
64. See COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 727–29. The right of aggrieved plaintiffs to act as
private attorneys general is a “necessary supplement” to SEC enforcement actions. See Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
65. See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketBased Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008).
66. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); supra note 9.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
68. See 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974); Fry, supra note 65, at 33.
69. See Michael J. Kaufman, Loss Causation: Exposing a Fraud on Securities Law
Jurisprudence, 24 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1991) (collecting authority that describes
causation, among other things, as “ungainly” and “confusing”).
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recover that overpayment in the market. 70 This overpayment distorts the
true value of the security, and the difference between the intrinsic worth of
the stock and its market price is commonly referred to as inflation.71 When
the truth of the fraud is revealed, plaintiffs must tie their alleged losses to
both the initial misstatement that distorted the market price, as well as to the
later disclosure of the fraud. 72 Though loss causation is still not uniformly
understood, this section reviews the history of the causation element and its
origins at common law. 73
Loss causation, as modern courts understand it, was not always an
element in Rule 10b-5 cases. 74 The traditional causation analysis
considered whether the plaintiff engaged in the securities transaction in
reliance on a defendant’s misstatement. 75 Early securities class actions
indicated that causation required something more than reliance, but those
courts did not indicate the nature of the additional proof.76 Without the
additional proof, the courts reasoned, a defendant would be liable to anyone
that relied on the misstatement as a cause of the transaction no matter the
reasons for the loss. 77 Finally, in 1974, the Second Circuit bifurcated
causation in Schlick. 78 This decision is widely cited as the first to separate
individual reliance, which occurs when “the violations in question caused
the [purchaser] to engage in the transaction in question,” from loss
causation, where “the misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic
harm.” 79
Unlike the Schlick court, the Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean court
provided some guidance for proof of loss causation.80 In Huddleston, the
Fifth Circuit reversed a district court decision not to instruct the jury on
both reliance and loss causation. 81 The court defined loss causation as the
plaintiff’s proof that “the untruth was in some reasonably direct, or
proximate, way responsible for his loss.” 82 Thus, to prove causation, a
70. Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. BUS.
& SEC. L. 93, 94–95 (2006).
71. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1.
72. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005).
73. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities
Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 815 (2009).
74. See Fox, supra note 20, at 834–35.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (listing the elements of common
law fraudulent misrepresentation); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–44
(1988).
76. See Fox, supra note 20, at 835.
77. See id. at 834–36 (quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1292
(2d Cir. 1969) (observing that a defendant could be liable “to all the world”)).
78. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380–81 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. See id. (noting that loss causation is demonstrated “rather easily” by proof of
economic damage); Fisch, supra note 73, at 816–17 (“The court—citing almost no
authority—explained that causation consists of two distinct components . . . .”).
80. See 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 459 U.S. 375
(1983); Fox, supra note 20, at 836.
81. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549–50. Courts often interchange transaction causation and
reliance when describing “but-for,” or actual, causation. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 338–42 (2005); Fox, supra note 20, at 842.
82. See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549 & n.24.
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plaintiff must prove that he would not have completed the transaction if he
knew the truth, and that the misrepresentation must “touch[] upon the
reasons for the investment’s decline.” 83
These “twin requirements” of loss causation and transaction causation are
now firmly established in case law,84 but courts applied these standards
inconsistently in the years following Schlick.85 Fortunately, modern courts
have provided litigants with more concrete guidance. Courts analyze
causation as three discrete yet related concepts.86 First, loss causation is
sometimes used to describe individual reliance—whether a plaintiff actually
relied on material misstatements to invest in a company’s stock. 87 Reliance
is also known as “transaction causation.” 88 While transaction causation is
an independent element of a securities fraud claim, 89 it is entwined with the
elements of materiality, loss causation, and damages. 90 These elements all
support the same substantive issue: the amount of inflation that a
misrepresentation causes, and therefore the amount that a plaintiff purchaser
overpays. 91 Reliance in securities class actions typically is satisfied by
asserting the “fraud on the market” (FOTM) theory, discussed in Part II of
this Note. 92
Secondly, loss causation refers to the but for causal relationship between
the alleged misconduct and the shareholder’s loss.93 Under this approach,
some portion of a plaintiff’s loss must be attributable to a defendant’s
misstatements or omissions; in other words, the misstatements must be a
cause-in-fact of the loss. 94 This form of loss causation requires plaintiffs to
show a sufficient connection tying the fraudulent conduct with the harm
suffered. 95 The mechanism of proof is a corrective disclosure, an event that
reveals the fraud that the original misstatement concealed. 96

83. See id. at 549.
84. See Fox, supra note 20, at 837.
85. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 345.
86. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509–10 (2d Cir. 2010)
(distinguishing between different types of loss causation). This section focuses primarily on
the law of the Second Circuit, the preeminent arbiter of securities disputes. See Jordan Milev
et al., Nat’l Econ. Research Assoc., Trends 2010 Year-End Update: Securities Class Action
Filings Accelerate in Second Half of 2010; Median Settlement at an All-Time High 4 (2010),
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_1210.pdf (noting that of the twelve
federal circuits, the Second Circuit saw the most securities class action filings from 2006–
09).
87. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509–10. Reliance concerns the causal relationship
between the misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s decision to buy or sell. See infra Part II.A.
88. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509–10; see also infra Part II.A.
89. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2007).
90. See Fox, supra note 20, at 845.
91. See id.; infra Part II.E.
92. See infra Part II.A (discussing the presumption of reliance and the elements of fraud
on the market).
93. In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 510.
94. See id.
95. Id. (quoting Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2007));
see infra Part III.C.
96. See infra Part III.C (discussing the different types of theories of loss causation).
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Some commentators refer to this approach as “strict” loss causation.97 If
the value of the security does not decline as a direct result of the
misrepresentation, there can be no loss attributable to the
misrepresentation. 98 Until the market corrects the price following a
corrective disclosure, the cost of the misrepresentation is reflected in the
price of the security, and this inflation can still be recovered by reselling the
security at a price that incorporates the inflation. 99 Thus, there is no loss
causation until inflation dissipates. 100
Finally, loss causation can refer to whether the events that actually
caused the loss are within the class of events that Congress intended the
securities laws to protect against.101 Courts analogize this concept to the
tort law doctrine of proximate cause, a policy limitation on liability.102
Similar to tort, under this articulation of loss causation, the plaintiff’s
damages must be foreseeable, and they must be caused by a materialization
of the concealed risk. 103 Second Circuit law limits that risk to a “zone of
risk” concealed by the misstatements.104 In effect, this examines how
closely the subject of the fraudulent statement relates to the loss, and
whether that loss was foreseeable. 105
Courts qualify the tort analogy. 106 While a foreseeable injury in tort is
one proximately caused by a defendant’s fault, the harm resulting from a
drop in a company’s share price is not caused by a defendant’s
misstatement, but rather as a result of market realization of the
circumstances concealed by the misstatement. 107

97. Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339–40 & n.3 (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223
F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000)).
98. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339–40 & n.3.
99. See id. The owner of the security suffers no loss, since the inflation can be passed
along to the next unsuspecting purchaser. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342 (2005); Olazábal, supra note 4, at 376.
100. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
101. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting
that proving reliance, as well as either of the corrective disclosure or materialization of the
risk approaches, is sufficient to establish causation); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396
F.3d 161, 172–75 (2d Cir. 2005); see also AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d
202, 209 (2d Cir. 2000) (articulating the analogy to proximate cause); infra Part III.B
(discussing corrective disclosure and materialization of the risk theories); infra note 116
(summarizing circuit law).
102. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73.
103. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 513; infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the
materialization of the risk theory).
104. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 513; Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257
F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001). Not all circuits recognize this theory. See Schleicher v.
Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the materialization of a concealed
risk theory “is not a legal doctrine” and it “adds nothing to the analysis” because the fraud
lies in the misstatement and the loss is realized when the truth is revealed).
105. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222 (3d Cir. 2006)).
106. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73. See generally Fisch, supra note 73 (discussing the
common law background of causation).
107. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73.
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Additionally, the tort metaphor is compromised by its origin in the
common law. 108 Causation in Rule 10b-5 actions has a different meaning
than it would in tort. 109 Securities fraud is a statutory claim, and the
elements of a statutory claim are those that the legislature intended.110
Thus, proximate cause determinations are closely tethered to statutory
intent. 111
The disclosure requirements of the securities laws seek to allow investors
to make accurate judgments about a company’s intrinsic value, rather than
force companies to speculate about distant or nebulous events.112
Therefore, a misstatement or omission is the proximate cause of an
investment loss if the risk that caused the loss was within the “zone of risk”
that the alleged misrepresentations concealed. 113 A loss is foreseeable if
the misstatement “concealed something from the market that, when
disclosed, negatively affected the value of the security.” 114
Courts in the Second Circuit require plaintiffs to prove reliance, as well
as either of the two articulations of loss causation, to establish causation.115
Other circuits apply these or similar tests for pleading and proof of loss
causation. 116
Causation is closely related to damages. Damages in securities cases are
calculated based on the impact of disclosure on the market price of a
security; proof of damages and causation assumes some degree of market
efficiency. This Note next explores the economic theory underlying the
determination of causation and damages in securities cases.

108. See id.; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
109. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 510.
110. See id.; Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
111. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 513–14 (granting defendants summary judgment
where generalized investor concern causing a temporary share price drop did not raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to loss causation).
112. See id. at 514.
113. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73.
114. See id. at 173.
115. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 511.
116. See Ind. State Dist. Counsel of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v.
Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 944–47 (6th Cir. 2009) (deciding motion to dismiss); Alaska
Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(deciding class certification and holding that the corrective disclosure does not need to
precisely mirror the misstatement); In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d
1130, 1140–42 (10th Cir. 2009) (deciding summary judgment and rejecting plaintiff’s theory
because it failed to identify the mechanism that revealed the fraud); McCabe v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2007) (deciding summary judgment); Tricontinental
Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 843 (7th Cir. 2007) (deciding
motion to dismiss and holding that causation must be applied on a statement-by-statement
basis).
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C. Good News, Bad News, and Surprises:
How Disclosure Affects Market Price
Though various theories exist as to how to predict stock market
behavior, 117 many economists have adopted the efficient capital markets
hypothesis (ECMH) as a core working hypothesis. 118 The ECMH ties stock
price to information and expectations. 119 The market values a security by
measuring the present value of the future cash flows generated by the
corporation’s assets discounted by the company’s cost of capital.120
According to the theory, the price of publicly-traded securities reflects the
aggregation of all well-informed investors’ beliefs about the investment’s
future payouts. 121 If a company misstates its past or present financial
condition, and the market is unaware of the firm’s true financial condition,
the investing public’s expectations of a company’s future performance are
inaccurate. 122 In turn, the market price of the security adjusts to reflect this
new information as soon as the market becomes aware of it. 123 While
market participants may value the information differently, the aggregation
of different valuations establishes the market price, and these divergent
valuations make trading possible. 124
If stock prices track expectations, it follows that even if a company
announces good news, the market price of a stock will not rise if this news
is anticipated; on the other hand, if the good news is not as good as
expected, share price could actually decline.125 Most importantly, when a
firm announces information that the market expects, or that is already
known, market price should not change.126 This central tenet of the ECMH
is the basis for FOTM, the primary theory of reliance in securities class
actions. 127

117. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 916 (1989) (observing that economists still debate
the causes of the 1929 Wall Street crash).
118. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 130.
119. See id. Economist Eugene Fama first proposed the theory in a landmark 1970
article. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970).
120. See Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 40 (2005). Famed economist
John Maynard Keynes first suggested that this form of market efficiency is untenable. See
Fischel, supra note 117, at 913. He analogized traders’ conceptions of asset value to
predicting the winner of a beauty contest. Id.
121. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 130; see also COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 104–
06 (noting the difficulties inherent in such a sweeping theory).
122. See Kaufman, supra note 120, at 40.
123. See id.
124. See COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 104.
125. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 707–08 (3d ed. 1992).
126. See id. at 707. The share price already incorporates that information. See id.
127. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 917–22. FOTM is discussed in Part II of this Note.
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Perhaps because of its sweeping application, market efficiency has come
under intense scrutiny. 128 Another theory, behavioral finance, posits that
markets are not necessarily information-efficient. 129 According to the
theory, biased, irrational investors can move the markets.130 These “noise”
traders transact in securities for motivations related to behavioral biases.131
As a consequence, noise traders make the markets possible; 132 noise
oscillates the value of a security away from its fundamental value.133 This
activity creates liquidity in the market and allows informed traders to profit
based on mispriced securities; 134 after all, if everyone agreed on prices,
trading would cease to exist.
Theorists take the existence of noise trading as a given, but are uncertain
about the extent of its effect on the market.135 If its effect is substantial,
noise trading would reduce market efficiency. 136 Pervasive behavioral
biases pose problems for FOTM: because noisy markets are irrational, the
scope of liability for improper disclosure would be unpredictable.137
Damages would be purely speculative, because many consider it impossible
to ascertain the amount of noise represented in market prices.138
Proponents of ECMH refute this criticism, however, by arguing that even if
some market participants make irrational investing decisions, sophisticated
traders quickly exploit and eliminate unexplored profit opportunities

128. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 684 (noting that as early as 1992, legal scholars
familiar with ECMH began to doubt the efficiency of securities markets (quoting Robert M.
Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring
Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577, 614 (1992))); Burch, supra note 15, at 354 (noting the
“numerous academic challenges” to ECMH); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 139–41 (2006). The 2008 financial crisis has also
undermined the ECMH. See Richard A. Posner, On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase
Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the Future of Law and Economics, 12 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 265, 278 (2010) (“[E]conomic theory . . . has taken some knocks as a result of
the economic crisis because it has revived awareness of the importance of uncertainty in
economic life, as well as undermining ‘efficient markets’ theory . . . .”). See generally JUSTIN
FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION
ON WALL STREET (2009) (discussing the state of ECMH in the wake of the largest economic
crisis since the Great Depression).
129. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 137–39 (illustrating some anomalies in the ECMH);
see also FOX, supra note 128, at 299 (explaining that overconfidence in investing is the most
consistent characteristic in behavioral finance).
130. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 137–39.
131. See id. at 137 (noting noise traders’ cognitive and heuristic errors, such as
overreaction to news).
132. See FOX, supra note 128, at 201–02.
133. See id. at 202.
134. Id.
135. See id. (arguing that noise trading makes it impossible to ascertain fundamental
value).
136. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 145; see also FOX, supra note 128, at 204–06
(discussing anomalies in ECMH).
137. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 137–39. But see Fischel, supra note 117, at 914
(noting that noise trading “increases volatility but does not create any detectable upward or
downward bias in pricing”).
138. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 914; supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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created by mispriced securities.139 At the very least, since the value of a
security cannot be isolated from indeterminate noise, the assumption of
market efficiency is the most accurate indicator of a security’s fundamental
value. 140 In other words, the ECMH is an elegant but assailable theory, and
it is the best available. Class action plaintiffs and their lawyers realized the
advantages of the ECMH, and soon used it to resolve the procedural hurdles
of satisfying the unique requirements of class certification.
D. The 800-Pound Gorilla: Class Actions
Class actions are a mechanism that permits mass aggregation of claims.
They are big, broad, and expensive. They are also special. Class actions
are an exception to the general rule that a judgment binds only those that are
parties to the action.141 Plaintiffs that seek to represent a class of similarlysituated individuals must first satisfy the prerequisites of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 to maintain a class action.142 Securities class action
plaintiffs typically seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires putative classes to satisfy two additional requirements. 143 A
“(b)(3)” class must demonstrate that common issues of fact or law
predominate over individual issues, and that the class action is a superior
method of adjudication.144 These stringent requirements ensure that class
representatives adequately represent the interests of absent class
members. 145 A class action judgment binds all members of the class and
has preclusive effect. 146
A court can certify a class only after conducting a rigorous inquiry into
the Rule 23 prerequisites. 147 Certification is a watershed moment that
substantially increases the settlement value of a lawsuit.148 Prior to the
Supreme Court’s Basic decision in 1988, 149 defendants attempted to defeat
139. See FOX, supra note 128, at 192 (noting that under ECMH, “[i]n a free financial
market, even a tiny rational minority would invariably prevail”). If irrational investors are
willing to buy or sell a security at a price different from its optimal future return,
sophisticated investors will exploit the opportunity for gain until it no longer exists. See id.
140. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 914 (noting that until noise trading is detectable,
“knowing that prices reflect the expectations of noise traders will not lead to any superior
method for ascertaining the underlying value of assets.”); id. at 915 (“[I]t takes a theory to
beat a theory and thus far none exists.”).
141. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23 requires, among other things, that the claims of the class
share some common question of fact or law, and the class representative must assert claims
typical of the class as a whole. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2006).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see, e.g., Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.
2010) (ruling on a class certification motion filed pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 32, 41–42 (reviewing
the prerequisites to class certification and determining the standard that courts must use to
determine whether a putative class satisfies each requirement of Rule 23).
145. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894–95 (2008).
146. See id.; Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160–61.
148. See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686. Certification may put so much pressure on
defendants that they may be willing to settle cases with unsubstantiated claims. See id.
149. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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class certification by arguing that reliance is essentially an individual issue
that predominates over class-wide issues. 150 In Basic, discussed later in
this Note, the Court blessed the district court’s use of the FOTM theory, an
application of the ECMH that posits that reliance on the integrity of the
market price of a security creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance.151
This reshaping of common law reliance forever altered the legal
landscape. 152 The perceived flood of frivolous litigation following the
landmark Basic decision prompted congressional action, resulting in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 153 (PSLRA). Though loss
causation ultimately rests on the market’s response to information, the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that reliance is distinct from loss
causation. 154 Following Halliburton, plaintiffs need not prove loss
causation to obtain certification because it is a merits issue of class-wide
proof. 155 A more detailed review of Halliburton and the Supreme Court’s
loss causation decisions follows.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CAUSATION TRILOGY:
BASIC, DURA, AND HALLIBURTON
Part II focuses on the three Supreme Court decisions that have directly
addressed loss causation. The Supreme Court embraced economic theory in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, and that decision effectively enabled modern
securities class actions.156 Because the Court upheld a presumption of
reliance based on FOTM, it made class actions much easier to maintain.
Congress responded to perceived abuses by class action plaintiffs with the
PSLRA, which codified loss causation, but provided very little guidance to
the courts. As a result, courts took divergent approaches to loss causation,
and the Supreme Court’s Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo decision
resolved only some of those differences.157 Causation and damages are
interlinked, and thus Part II briefly summarizes theories of damages
following the discussion of Dura. Part II then concludes with a review of
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., and the consequences of that
decision.

150. See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 681–82; In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d
24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating a class certification decision on predominance grounds).
151. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47; see infra Part II.A.
152. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 347–48 (noting the frequency of frivolous class action
lawsuits filed after Basic).
153. See infra Part II.B.
154. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011); see
also infra Part II.E (discussing Halliburton).
155. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186.
156. See 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see also infra Part II.A.
157. See 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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A. Back to Basic: Fraud on the Market and the Rebuttable Presumption
of Reliance
At common law, plaintiffs had to prove that they reasonably relied on a
material misstatement that induced the fraudulent transaction.158 This
element of proof—reliance—establishes a causal link between the
misconduct and the disputed transaction.159 The courts integrated reliance
into Rule 10b-5 claims arising from both face-to-face and open-market
transactions. 160 As the class action developed, some courts considered
severing individual reliance issues, requiring separate trials for each class
member. 161 To avoid these costly endeavors, class action plaintiffs began
advocating a form of reliance defined by reliance on the integrity of the
market price, rather than actual reliance on a misstatement or omission.162
This theory became known as fraud on the market, and it applies the ECMH
to posit that because “most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule
10b-5 action.” 163
Some courts endorsed FOTM and allowed plaintiffs to avoid the
cumbersome process of individual proof of actual reliance. 164 Over time,
courts eased the reliance requirement, and widespread application of FOTM
took hold by the early 1980s. 165 Given FOTM’s perceived departure from
the common law, defendants vigorously challenged its application.166 The
theory reached the Supreme Court in 1988.167
In its seminal holding, the Basic Court did not expressly adopt FOTM in
Rule 10b-5 actions, but it permitted the lower courts to apply a presumption
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). Reliance in FOTM cases is
also known as transaction causation, and serves as the but for cause of the fraudulent
transaction. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341–42; supra Part I.B (distinguishing between different
articulations of causation).
159. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). The facts of the case
concerned the defendant’s representations about a potential merger. See id. at 227–28.
160. See id. at 243–44.
161. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968); 4 HAZEN, supra note 7,
§ 12.10[5], at 124 (noting the high costs of single-issue trials for each class member).
162. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; Fischel, supra note 117, at 908; supra Part I.D
(discussing class actions).
163. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247; see also id. at 241–44; Fischel, supra note 117, at 908–11;
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 151, 153, 158–59 (characterizing Basic as a “profound” but “enigmatic” decision).
164. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905–07 (9th Cir. 1975); Fischel, supra
note 117, at 908.
165. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 250 & n.1 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972) (holding that
actual reliance is unnecessary and that reliance is presumed where an omission is material);
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 905–06 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153–54). By the
1980s, ECMH had gained traction not only in law and economics, but the hypothesis also
drove policy making. See Langevoort, supra note 163, at 158.
166. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (majority opinion). But see Fischel, supra note 117, at
908 (noting that FOTM indicates the ultimate proof of objectively reasonable reliance, the
judgment of a consensus of market makers about the value of a security).
167. Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
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of reliance to plaintiffs asserting FOTM. 168 In reaching this “common
sense” decision, the Court noted the distinctions between face-to-face
transactions and purchases and sales on the open market. 169 In developed
securities markets, a company’s stock price is determined by all available
Individual investors do not engage in face-to-face
information. 170
negotiations with the culpable parties, but the information is still
transmitted to the investor in the form of the stock price.171 Misleading
statements defraud investors because investors rely on the market price of a
security as an indicator of its true value.172 Under FOTM, reliance on the
integrity of the market price establishes the requisite causal connection
between the fraud and the purchase or sale of stock. 173 Essentially, the
market acts “as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given
all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price.” 174 It follows that plaintiffs can be defrauded even if they are
completely unaware of the misstatement. 175
The presumption of reliance established by FOTM typically has three
elements. 176 First, the misstatement must be material; second, the security
must trade in an efficient market; and third, the misstatement must have
been publicly disseminated. 177 The link between the misrepresentation and
the purchase price is not invariably strong, however, and defendants can
rebut the presumption with “[a]ny showing that severs the link” between the

168. See id. at 241–42, 250 (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance
supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”).
169. See id. at 242–44, 244 n.22, 246.
170. See id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986));
supra Part I.C.
171. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–44 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). In holding that
investors rely on the integrity of the market price, the Court, perhaps echoing Theodore
Roosevelt, asked, “Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap[s] game?” Id. at
245–47, 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)); see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
172. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–44 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). To put it
another way, the share price is an aggregation of the different evaluations of a stock’s value
by different market participants. See id. at 244. The investor acts in reliance on the
misstatement because the investor trusts that the stock is worth the market price. See id. at
244–45.
173. See id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). This, of course, does not
establish the causal connection between the misstatement and the loss. See supra Part I.B.
174. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D.
Tex. 1980)).
175. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 908.
176. See 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.10[6][A], at 130.
177. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27; In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d
474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008). Courts often cite the test set forth in Cammer v. Bloom to determine
whether shares trade in an efficient market. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989); see, e.g., In re
DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011). The “Cammer factors” include
the average weekly trading volume, the number of securities analysts reporting on the
security, the extent to which market makers traded the security, the issuer’s eligibility to file
an SEC registration Form S-3 (a registration form for seasoned reporting companies), and
the cause-and-effect relationship between material disclosures and changes in the security’s
price. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87.
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misrepresentation and the price paid by the plaintiff.178 Defendants can
rebut the presumption if the securities traded in an inefficient market.179
However, the presumption is extremely difficult to rebut for issuers whose
securities are traded on national exchanges. 180
The Basic decision left some open questions. Among them, the Court
did not adopt any rule establishing how quickly publicly-available
information must be reflected in the market price. 181 Justice White’s
opinion criticized the plurality for applying an economic rationale at the
cost of legal analysis, as well as for creating a presumption that is “virtually
impossible” to rebut. 182 Despite these concerns, the Basic decision
revolutionized securities fraud. 183 Not only did Basic’s tacit endorsement
of FOTM permit the circuit courts to develop their own FOTM rules, it
made aggregation of claims in the form of class actions much easier.
B. Legislative Reform: The PSLRA Codifies Causation
Following the Basic decision, and in response to growing concerns over
the expanding use of the class action device, Congress enacted the
PSLRA. 184 The PSLRA represented the first substantial congressional
reforms to the securities laws since the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts. 185 Congress

178. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
179. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that because initial public offerings are sold in an undeveloped market, it is
therefore not efficient, and thus FOTM is not available); 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.10, at
135 (“It is axiomatic that the fraud-on-the-market presumption depends on the existence of
an active market.”). See generally Matt Silverman, Note, Fraud Created the Market:
Presuming Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Primary Securities Market Fraud Litigation, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1787 (2011), for an analysis of FOTM’s companion doctrine in primary
markets.
180. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980); cf. Basic, 485
U.S. at 252, 255–56, 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906–07 & n.22 (9th Cir. 1975)).
181. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28 (majority opinion). The Supreme Court had the
opportunity to address this issue in Apollo Group, Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit
Fund, but denied certiorari. See 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011). This Note discusses Apollo in Part
III.E.
182. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 252, 255–56, 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
183. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (majority opinion); Fischel, supra note 117, at 907
(noting that FOTM “revolutionized” securities fraud); see also Barbara Black, Fraud on the
Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market
Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 441 (1984) (a pre-Basic article indicating that individual
reliance prohibited the use of the class action mechanism in Rule 10b-5 cases); Fisch, supra
note 73, at 818–19; infra Part II.B (discussing Congress’s response to the proliferation of
class actions following Basic).
184. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.); see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 347–61
(1996); Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1013–15, 1018 (1996) (noting that prior to the
PSLRA, “there were no compelling reasons not to initiate speculative class action lawsuits”).
185. Phillips & Miller, supra note 184, at 1009.
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hoped the PSLRA would combat abusive techniques used by plaintiffs and
their lawyers, including initiating “strike” suits, 186 coercing settlements
with the threat of expensive discovery, and manipulation of class action
plaintiffs by their attorneys. 187 Congress sought to eliminate suits filed by
the plaintiffs’ bar immediately after any significant drop in a company’s
stock price, regardless of whether evidence of fraud existed.188 Among
other reforms, the PSLRA placed restrictions on class representatives,
attorney’s fees, and the scope of discovery. 189 Importantly, the PSLRA
requires that plaintiffs specify each misleading statement for which they
seek relief, 190 and it established a damages cap.191 To avoid providing
successful plaintiffs with a windfall caused by market overreaction to bad
news, the PSLRA caps damages to the difference between the sale price of
the security and its mean trading price over the ninety days following the
disclosure of the fraud. 192
In response to concerns that some courts adopted a presumption of loss
causation, 193 Congress codified the causation element as part of the
PSLRA. 194 Since the PSLRA, courts have used loss causation as a
gatekeeping mechanism that restricts the flow of frivolous securities class
actions. 195 While Congress codified causation, the PSLRA did not indicate
how parties could prove it. 196 In the absence of legislative guidance, courts
took charge of the matter.

186. A strike suit is an action “without reasonable grounds to believe it has merit.” Elliott
J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2085
(1995). A strike suit has a negative net present value, since the plaintiff cannot prevail on
the merits. Id. at 2086.
187. 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.15[1], at 251 & n.10. See generally James D. Cox,
Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997) (weighing
criticisms of the class action device post-PSLRA); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform:
Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533 (1997) (assessing the PSLRA
reforms).
188. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687;
Olazábal, supra note 4, at 347.
189. See generally 4 Hazen, supra note 7, § 12.15[1] (summarizing the reforms
implemented by the PSLRA).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345
(2005).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).
192. See id.; Burch, supra note 15, at 355–57.
193. See Avery, supra note 184, at 362 n.189 (citing Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory
Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37
UCLA L. REV. 883, 913–17 (1990)).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, the
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to
violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”);
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (noting that the
plaintiffs bear the burden of proof of causation but defendant could prove that “factors
unrelated to the fraud contributed to the loss”).
195. See Fisch, supra note 73, at 816, 825.
196. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 348.
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C. A Tangle of Causation: The Dura Decision
To resolve a split among circuits over pleading loss causation, the
Supreme Court decided Dura. 197 The crux of the allegations concerned
alleged misrepresentations by the defendant Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
regarding profits from drug sales, as well as the likelihood of Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval of an asthmatic spray device.198
Dura’s share price lost almost half its value when Dura announced lower
than expected earnings. 199 The share price declined further when Dura later
announced that the FDA would not approve its asthmatic spray device.200
Despite these declines, the stock price recovered within a week of the final
corrective disclosure. 201
In the wake of the PSLRA’s codification of loss causation, 202 courts
applied divergent pleading standards for loss causation. 203 Some courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, endorsed the “purchase price inflation”
theory. 204 Purchase price inflation posits that plaintiffs suffer their loss
when they purchase securities inflated by misrepresentation, rather than
when the concealed fraud materializes and the stock suffers a coordinate
price drop. 205
The Supreme Court rejected this theory of causation and loss.206
Beginning with an analysis of proof of causation in common law fraud
actions, the Court cited authority focusing on traditional reliance actions,
rather than FOTM cases. 207 The Court suggested that while an artificially
inflated share price is necessary to plead loss causation, it is not sufficient—
an inflated purchase price might, but it does not always, cause economic
loss. 208 According to the Court, a purchaser of an artificially inflated
security has suffered no loss at the moment of purchase; the shareholder
could simply resell the security at the purchase price on the market, or even
profit from a sale of the security before the fraud is revealed.209 It is only
after the truth of the fraud reaches the market that an investor has suffered

197. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
198. See id. at 339.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See supra Part II.B.
203. See Thomas F. Gillespie, III, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed
Opportunity to Right the Wrongs in the PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule 10b-5
Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161, 167–68 (2008).
204. See, e.g., Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544
U.S. 336.
205. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 338.
206. See id. at 342 (“[A]s a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes
place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership
of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value.”).
207. See Fox, supra note 20, at 865 (“[T]he common law cases on causation provide very
little meaningful guidance to the question before the Court.”).
208. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
209. See id. at 342–43 (“[I]f, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the
relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss.”).
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any loss. 210 Under the ECMH, as soon as the market is aware of the fraud,
inflation dissipates, depressing the market price to the value of the security
absent the fraud—in other words, the stock reaches its true value. 211 Thus,
under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a purchaser who bought artificially
inflated shares could sell the shares prior to the disclosure of the truth, yet
still recover damages in subsequent litigation.212 The purchase price
inflation theory failed because it does not sufficiently allege either causation
or loss. 213 To buttress its holding, the Court emphatically noted that Rule
10b-5 suits exist “not to provide investors with broad insurance against
market losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that
misrepresentations actually cause.” 214
To reach this decision, the Dura Court noted that it must be the
misrepresentation that causes the loss, rather than some other of the “tangle
of factors” affecting share price.215 Changing market conditions, industry
downturns, or company-specific factors unrelated to fraud could cause a
drop in share price. 216 While Dura expressly requires plaintiffs to prove
the effect of the misstatements on the value of the security as a whole, the
decision did not guide the lower courts on issues of proof.217 This led to the
current loss causation climate involving hotly-litigated evidentiary
issues. 218 Before considering the byzantine methods of proof of loss
causation, it is important to understand the types of damages that informed
the Dura decision.
D. No Harm, No Foul: A Brief Note on Dura and Types of Damages
Given the relative few securities class actions to proceed to the liability
stage, 219 authority on damages is both inconsistent and problematic.220 At
210. See id.
211. See Fox, supra note 20, at 864 (criticizing the Court’s language concerning that
revelation of the truth to the market following an initially inflated share price “might mean a
later loss”). If the share price was initially inflated due to a misstatement, a revelation of the
truth of the fraud must cause a loss under the ECMH. See id. (noting that this conclusion of
the Dura Court was “wrong”).
212. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. The Dura Court explicitly refused to consider a scenario
where an “in and out” trader sells shares for more than the inflated purchase price, but before
the market price of the security deflates following the revelation of the truth. See id. at 343.
“In and out” traders are investors who have sold their shares prior to the corrective
disclosure. See David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule
10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1792 & n.103 (2000).
213. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 346 (noting that Congress had clear intent “to permit private
securities fraud actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately allege and
prove the traditional elements of causation and loss. . . . [T]he Ninth Circuit’s approach
would allow recovery where a misrepresentation leads to an inflated purchase price but
nonetheless does not proximately cause any economic loss.”).
214. Id. at 345.
215. See id. at 343.
216. See id. at 342–43.
217. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 341 (noting that the Court disposed of the case “in a
characteristically minimalist way, declining to articulate a clear loss causation standard”).
218. Id. at 339.
219. See supra note 25.
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common law, courts often awarded rescissory damages for face-to-face
transactions, 221 but modern courts soon realized that contract remedies were
inappropriate for litigation arising from open-market transactions. 222 Most
courts adopted an out-of-pocket remedy. 223 Out-of-pocket losses equal the
difference between the price paid or received for the security, and the actual
value of the security if it were not artificially inflated by fraud.224 Under
this theory of damages, an investor with a positive net recovery on the
transaction is not entitled to any later recovery. 225 Thus, if a security
appreciates following the revelation of a misrepresented fact, a purchaser
could not recover even though the investment is worth less than it would
have been absent the fraud. 226
Dura requires plaintiffs to tie their losses to the defendant’s
misrepresentation. 227 Loss causation should therefore subject defendants
only to actual, compensable injuries, 228 thus serving the deterrent function
of private remedies. 229 Since unpredictable damages undermine deterrence,
out-of-pocket recovery bolsters a class action’s ability to deter fraud.230
Furthermore, some commentators note that the out-of-pocket rule is the
only measure of damages consistent with the common law, the loss
causation requirement, and the PSLRA. 231
220. See Burch, supra note 15, at 349, 353, 355 (calling for an out-of-pocket measure of
damages and noting that “no coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating open-market
damages in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class actions”); see also 4 HAZEN, supra note 7,
§ 12.12[1][A], at 179 (noting that the current state of the law is “difficult” because most
litigation does not proceed to a final judgment). The PSLRA’s framers also found this issue
difficult. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 19 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 698
(“The current method of calculating damages in 1934 Act securities fraud cases is complex,
with no statutory guidance to provide certainty.”).
221. See Burch, supra note 15, at 363. In face-to-face transactions, courts sometimes
applied the “benefit-of-the-bargain” rule based in contract law, where the aggrieved party
could recover expectation damages, defined as the amount the plaintiffs would have
received, including profits, if the defendant had performed. See id. at 365.
222. See id. at 362–64.
223. See id. at 359, 362–64.
224. See id. at 364 & nn.78–79. This measure assumes that the investor held the security
through the final corrective disclosure of the class period. See id.
225. See id. at 364–65.
226. See id. However, in dicta, Dura did not proscribe recovery under this hypothetical
set of facts. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005); Burch, supra note
15, at 360 (noting the problem of corporations bundling good and bad news to prevent share
price decline); Fox, supra note 20, at 846–57 (describing hypothetical damages scenarios
that Dura did not address). This issue is still unsettled. See Fox, supra note 20, at 847.
227. See Burch, supra note 15, at 386; supra Part II.C (discussing the Dura holding).
228. See id. at 386.
229. See id. at 394.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 396; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) (limiting damages to actual
damages caused by the fraud). As one of the PSLRA’s reforms, damages were limited to the
difference between the sale price of the security and the mean trading price in the ninety
days following the disclosure correcting the misstatement. See Burch, supra note 15, at 356–
57. This is known as the “bounce-back” provision. See Robert A. Fumerton, Market
Overreaction and Loss Causation, 62 BUS. LAW. 89, 90 (2006). One commentator notes that
market overreaction can occur not only after the final corrective disclosure of a class period,
but to all corrective disclosures made across a class period. See id. at 92.
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Even if out-of-pocket damages are the standard rule in most securities
class actions, there is no uniform model for proving those losses.232
Damages assessments require expert testimony opining on what a security
would have been worth had it not been tainted by fraud. 233 Expert inflation
models project per-share damages across the length of the class period.234
Perhaps because of the difficulties in ascertaining out-of-pocket loss, courts
often hold that while damages cannot be speculative, they “need not be
calculated with mathematical precision.” 235 This Note argues that damages
should be calculated with greater precision given their inextricability from
causation. 236
E. A Merits Issue: Halliburton’s Impact on Proof of Loss Causation
The Supreme Court decided Halliburton in June 2011. 237 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant Halliburton Co. made misstatements concerning
its expected liability in asbestos litigation, its anticipated revenues, and the
potential benefits of a merger.238 The decision reversed a line of cases from
the Fifth Circuit that required plaintiffs to prove loss causation to obtain the
presumption of reliance, and therefore class certification. 239
The Fifth Circuit’s cases illustrate the intersection of reliance and loss
causation. In Halliburton, the district court declined to certify a class
because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate loss causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.240 For class certification purposes,
plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit could show either an increase in the stock price
after the release of false news, or demonstrate a decrease in price following
a corrective disclosure. 241 The plaintiffs did not argue that any of the
misstatements caused inflation, and the lower court rejected the plaintiffs’
claims that the purported corrective disclosures tied to any fraud, thus
defeating the requisite causal connection.242 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 243
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s apparent conflation of
loss causation and reliance. 244 The Court carefully distinguished loss
232. See Burch, supra note 15, at 390.
233. See id. at 389–90.
234. See infra Part III.B.
235. Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 928, 934
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Hoefferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. Divco-Wayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543,
553 (7th Cir. 1975)); see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512,
562 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
236. See infra Part IV.
237. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
238. Id. at 2183.
239. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179.
240. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2183–84.
241. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 3:02-CV1152-M, 2008 WL 4791492, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008), aff’d, 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir.
2010), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131
S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
242. See id. at *4, *5–20.
243. 597 F.3d 330.
244. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–87.
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causation from reliance, noting that reliance is a distinct element of proof
that is “focused on facts surrounding the investor’s decision to engage in
the transaction.” 245 Loss causation is conceptually distinct because it
“requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation that affected the
integrity of the market price also caused a subsequent economic loss,”
rather than just a distortion at the time of the transaction. 246
On appeal, Halliburton argued that some of the alleged misstatements did
not result in a change in the market price of the defendant’s securities. 247 In
other words, the market did not react to Halliburton’s false statements.248
A lack of price impact of an alleged misstatement can be attributed to
several factors: that the statement is immaterial, or that the securities are
traded in an inefficient market. 249 Where there is no price impact, it
follows that there is no loss causation. 250 Halliburton argued that this lack
of price impact defeated reliance as well. 251 Halliburton based this on the
rationale that if the market price of a security reflects all public information,
and that reliance is based on the integrity of the market, there can be no
reliance on statements that do not impact the market price of securities.252
The Supreme Court did not address this argument because the Fifth Circuit
clearly held that putative classes must prove loss causation—not reliance—
to obtain certification.253
For purposes of this Note, the Supreme Court’s decision was most
notable because it roundly affirmed loss causation’s role as a merits issue
that, when disputed, must be decided at trial.254 In Part III, this Note
considers the evidence that parties use to prove loss causation. These
methods are based on the application of the ECMH to statistical regression
analyses. Juries have misapplied these models in several recent trials.
III. THE EVIDENCE: HOW DO YOU PROVE LOSS CAUSATION AT TRIAL?
Part III considers the evidentiary aspects of loss causation. Expert
witnesses must carefully parse the disclosures that substantiate plaintiffs’
245. Id. at 2186.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 2187.
248. See id.
249. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481–83 (2d Cir. 2008);
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007),
abrogated by Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179.
250. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186.
251. See id. at 2186–87.
252. See id.; Brief for Amicus Curiae Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association in Support of Respondents at 8–9, Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 091403), 2011 WL 1253910, at *8–9. The parties did not dispute that Halliburton’s securities
traded in an efficient market, so, according to FOTM, all public information was
incorporated into the market price. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Erica
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179.
253. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (noting that although the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
“may include some language consistent with a ‘price impact’ approach . . . we simply cannot
ignore the Court of Appeals’ repeated and explicit references to ‘loss causation’”).
254. See id. at 2183.
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claims of price distortion and dissipation. This part first reviews the basic
statistical principles underlying event studies. These event studies isolate
the impact of disclosure on the market price of securities, yielding measures
of damages. Experts sometimes extrapolate these models backwards to
calculate damages on each day of class periods. Part III then considers
some common theories of causation that identify the mechanisms for
disclosure of the concealed fraud. These models are complicated when
experts link specific misstatements to inflation; many cases concern
hundreds of alleged misstatements. Litigants in several recent trials used
comparable causation models, and the juries’ application of those models
ran afoul of Dura. This part concludes with an exploration of those trials.
A. The Event Study: Making Sense of the “Tangle of Factors”
Dura was a narrow decision that rejected the purchase price inflation
theory of pleading, 255 but courts apply the decision at later procedural
stages. 256 Many courts require experts to conduct event studies, which
isolate the effect of company-specific news from market-wide factors. 257 In
the context of securities litigation, an event study is traditionally defined as
a statistical regression analysis that determines the effect of an event on the
market price of a security. 258 An event study answers one critical question:
what would the market price of a stock be but for the fraud that distorted its
value? 259 The reliability of the event study, which interlinks materiality,
reliance, loss causation, and damages, is perhaps the overriding evidentiary
issue in securities fraud actions.260 The event study is predicated on
efficient capital markets, because a security’s market price incorporates all
public information. 261 Given its essential role in these cases, the event
study cannot be based on “junk science.” 262

255. See Fox, supra note 20, at 846 (noting that the decision was “extremely narrow” and
that Dura simply rejected the theory that an investor suffers a loss at the time of purchase);
see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 n.23 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting that Dura did not define an appropriate pleading standard; rather, it simply
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “overly permissive” standard).
256. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (citing circuit decisions applying Dura).
257. See, e.g., In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL
1585605, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011).
258. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling
Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
183, 186–87 (2009).
259. See Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for
Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 BUS. LAW. 955, 957 (2007).
260. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 187 (suggesting that event studies
have become an independent, essential element of a securities fraud claim).
261. See id. at 190.
262. See id. Of course, expert testimony must satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the Supreme Court’s test for admissibility of expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Before a court admits expert testimony, it
must consider, among other things, whether the techniques used by the expert have been
tested, have been subject to peer review, whether the technique has a potential rate of error,
and whether the scientific community has generally accepted the technique. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592–95; see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 189–90.
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To prepare an event study, experts must first identify the instances that
led the market to change its expectations about the value of a company’s
stock. 263 These “events” include the fraudulent statements themselves, and
the disclosure that first reveals the truth of the fraud to the market. 264 These
misstatements inflate the share price, but inflation dissipates once the
market becomes aware of the truth of the concealed fraud. 265
Experts next select the “event window,” the interval over which the
expert calculates stock price movements. 266 Stock prices may not respond
to an event instantaneously, because sometimes the market gradually comes
to terms with the new information; experts often limit the window to the
day of the event, 267 but windows sometimes extend over longer
intervals. 268 While longer windows may incorporate the full market
response to the event, they may also incorporate unrelated factors.269
Importantly, where multiple events occur rapidly, longer windows may
distort the analysis. 270 Therefore, to achieve an optimal estimate of
inflation, experts should restrict the event window if multiple disclosures
occur over a short period. 271
To ascertain the true value of the stock, the expert must isolate the effect
of the fraud on the share price from other unrelated factors that affect a
security’s market value. 272 These factors include market-wide, industrywide, and company-specific factors unrelated to fraud. 273 Unrelated events
in the “tangle” of factors affecting share price are known as confounding
events. 274 To isolate the effect of the event, the expert examines the
263. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191. Often, plaintiffs’ lawyers
select these events. See id. at 191 n.27.
264. See id. at 191; Allen, supra note 259, at 958 (noting that selection of events is
perhaps the most important component of an event study). The “announcement date” must
be identifiable; the market cannot have anticipated it. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra
note 258, at 191–92. These announcements can take several forms. See infra Part III.C
(discussing corrective disclosures, leakage, and materialization of the risk theories).
265. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191; infra note 302.
266. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191–92.
267. See id.
268. See Allen, supra note 259, at 958 (noting that where information is gradually leaked,
the market may take more time to respond, justifying a longer window); see also Kaufman &
Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191 & n.30. Though the markets typically take a day to
respond, experts often use a three-day event window to account for the difficulties associated
with gradual leakage of the information to the public. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra
note 258, at 192; Allen, supra note 259, at 958.
269. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191.
270. See Allen, supra note 259, at 959.
271. See id. (“Intuitively, one cannot disentangle the abnormal return associated with a
single event when there are several announcements within the same event window. That is,
the stock price does not have sufficient time between announcements to return to ‘normal’ so
as to form a baseline for the subsequent event.”).
272. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192–93, 198.
273. See id. at 192–93.
274. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005); Kaufman &
Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 231; see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634
F. Supp. 2d 352, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441,
1447 (11th Cir. 1997)) (noting that distinguishing share price declines caused by extraneous
factors from those caused by a corrective disclosure is generally the province of an expert).
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relationship of the stock price movement of the company to the movement
of a market or industry index over a specified length of time. 275 Experts
select an appropriate market model, such as the capital asset pricing model,
to determine the security’s sensitivity to overall market-wide moves over
non-event periods. 276 This determines the stock’s volatility—its sensitivity
to general market conditions. 277 Expert then apply the model over the event
window to determine the “normal” return that would have prevailed absent
the event. 278 This isolates the effect of the event from other market-wide
and industry-wide changes. 279
If there is any remaining price movement, it is considered “abnormal”;
abnormal return is the difference between the actual return controlled for
market and industry movement, and the normal return. 280 If the abnormal
return is high enough, it is likely statistically significant.281 In effect, the
analysis measures the amount of inflation or deflation in a security’s market
price on any given day. 282
Courts exclude flawed event studies, including those that fail to
disaggregate company-specific, non-fraud related news. 283 This scenario
often occurs where multiple disclosures of bad news are made on the same
day. Confounding events are only some of the difficulties that enter an
expert’s analysis of the causal effect of “truth” entering the market. 284 To
prepare the event study, an expert must identify events by considering the
mechanisms that reveal the concealed risks to the market. 285 Though
experts do not prepare event studies for every day of class periods, event
studies form the basis for damages assessments, which measure the pershare dollar value of inflation. The next section of this Note summarizes
some common methodologies for calculating inflation and damages.

275. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 193. This is called “running a
regression”; the period of time is often similar in length to the event window. See id.
276. See Allen, supra note 259, at 957–58; see also Esther Bruegger & Frederick C.
Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L.
11, 16–18 (2009).
277. See Allen, supra note 259, at 957.
278. See id.
279. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192–93.
280. See Allen, supra note 259, at 957.
281. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192–93. Abnormal returns must be
statistically significant to account for chance price movement. Id.
282. See Allen, supra note 259, at 956; Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 186–
99.
283. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 208–10 & nn.154 & 157 (noting that
a faulty event study can prevent class certification and that a proper event study considers
materiality and market efficiency, in addition to loss causation and damages); see also infra
note 337 and accompanying text.
284. Kaufman and Wunderlich argue that requiring an event study is unconstitutional and
inconsistent with the securities laws; since determining the credibility of experts is a
quintessential issue of fact, the judge “usurps” the jury’s role by removing competing expert
testimony from jury consideration. See generally Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at
220–60.
285. See infra Part III.C.
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B. Where the Money Is: Damages & Inflation Methodologies
Experts often opine on per-share damages to the class. 286 Damages
analyses in securities fraud claims typically begin with the event study
detailing the “true” price of a security—that is, measuring the value of the
security absent the alleged fraud. 287 The event study measures inflation and
dissipation on statistically significant abnormal returns. 288 Based on the
abnormal returns, an expert determines artificial inflation, then “back-casts”
the inflation using one of three common approaches to establish a value line
measuring damages over each day of the class period.289 These approaches
are known as the index method, the constant percentage method, and the
constant dollar method, and they purport to identify the true value of the
share on any given day in the class period, at least for purposes of
measuring damages. 290
According to the index method, the company’s share price rises and falls
in proportion to an established market index. 291 If, for example, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell 10 percent over the course of the class period,
the “true” price of the company’s shares would have fallen at that same
rate. 292
The constant percentage method assumes that inflation does not vary
unless the company makes additional misstatements. 293 An expert “backcasts” from the final market price, and sets the amount of inflation as an
unchanging percentage of the share price after the final corrective
disclosure. 294
286. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1.
287. See id. at 1; supra Part III.A. These methodologies are most useful for settlement
purposes; juries in recent trials have made findings of fact of share price inflation on a daily
basis. See In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-3400, 2010 WL
4537550, at *20 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010); infra Part III.E.
288. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
289. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1.
290. See id.; Jeff G. Hammel & B. John Casey, Sizing Securities Fraud Damages:
‘Constant Percentage’ on Way Out?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 2009, at 4; see also William O.
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54
EMORY L.J. 843, 877 & n.97 (2005). Each of these models assumes that after the final
corrective disclosure of the event study, the actual price and true price are equivalent; that is,
inflation in the share price goes to zero. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1–2.
291. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1–2; see also Hammel & Casey, supra note 290.
292. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 2 (conducting similar calculations based on the S&P
500 index). Thus, if the index fell 10 percent over the class period, and if a share is worth
$20 following the misstatement, $12 on the day before the truth hits the market, and the
value of the stock is $9 following the corrective disclosure, the “true” price at the start of the
class period would be $10. See id. Therefore, damages would equal the original market
price, $20, minus $10. Id. This example is grossly oversimplified, since it accounts for a
class period with only one misrepresentation, a paradigmatic corrective disclosure, and no
confounding events. See id.; supra Part III.A.
293. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 2.
294. See id. If the actual stock price is $9 at the end of the class period, it fell 25 percent
from the pre-corrective price of $12. See id. This percentage is constant throughout the
entire post-misrepresentation period, so under the constant percentage method, damages
equal 25 percent of the $20 initial share price, or $5, for class members who purchased on
the day of the misrepresentation. See id.
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Under the constant dollar method, the price drop at the end of the class
period represents the uniform amount of dollar inflation following the most
recent misstatement. 295 Under this method, the dollar value of inflation
remains constant over the period between misstatements and corrective
disclosures. 296
These three methods yield three different results, and when spread over
multiple misstatements in longer class periods, experts’ analyses can
possibly overstate or understate damages depending solely on the choice of
methodology. 297 One commentator notes that, post-Dura, only the constant
dollar method is legally tenable.298 Perhaps because these methods of
calculating damages do not produce uniform results, courts in recent trials
required the juries to determine damages for each day of lengthy class
periods. 299 Identifying the mechanism that reveals the truth of the fraud to
the market complicates damages further.
C. Coming Clean: Disclosure Mechanisms
An event study determines the amount of inflation and deflation in the
period surrounding a misstatement, as well as when its truth is revealed to
the public. 300 Statistical events do not easily correlate to real-world events;
the truth of a concealed fraud may enter the market through various
mechanisms. 301 While the means of dissipation are not necessarily
foreseeable, dissipation itself is an inevitable consequence. 302 In other
words, the market will always learn the truth. 303 After Dura, disclosure
mechanisms triggering dissipation warranted intense judicial scrutiny. 304
1. The Corrective Disclosure
Dura’s requirement that a stock price show decline after the truth of the
fraud hits the market is heavily litigated. 305 Plaintiffs often satisfy this
295. See id. at 3.
296. See id. In this hypothetical, the difference between the actual price prior to the
corrective disclosure and the price after is $3.
297. See id. at 3; Hammel & Casey, supra note 290, at 7 (suggesting that the constant
percentage method does not satisfy Dura, since it potentially allows purchasers to recover
for share price declines caused by factors other than fraud). The In re Williams Sec. Litig.WCG Subclass district court rejected the constant percentage model. 558 F.3d 1130, 1134
n.2 (10th Cir. 2009); see also In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV3400, 2010 WL 4537550, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010) (“More aggressive methods of
calculation could result in damages ranging from approximately $25 million to
approximately $120 million.”).
298. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 13.
299. See infra Part III.E.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 101.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 119 (advocating a broad standard for loss causation and noting that courts
have identified various definitions of “truth” on the market and adopted per se rules
excluding any losses incurred before the truth is revealed).
305. See id.; Pietrzak & McLaughlin, supra note 23.
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requirement by alleging a “corrective disclosure,” a public statement that
The classic corrective
reveals some previously concealed fact.306
disclosure occurs when defendants make a material misstatement, conceal
it, and then publicly reveal the full scope of their fraud. 307 Corporate press
releases, market analyst reports,308 ratings downgrades, and newspaper
publications can serve this role, 309 though Dura did not specify a standard
for identifying corrective disclosures. 310 A corrective disclosure is often
identified by a dramatic drop in stock price immediately following a
disclosure, 311 because all share price inflation dissipates once the market
learns the whole truth. 312 The Tenth Circuit’s decision in In re Williams
Securities Litigation-WCG Subclass illustrates the court’s reluctance to
allow claims to survive summary judgment where an expert fails to select
events properly. 313 In that decision, the court expressed skepticism that the
plaintiffs could prepare a complaint on the very day of the first corrective
disclosure if the public was not already aware of those facts. 314
The next section considers when the truth of previously concealed frauds
does not enter the market through a paradigmatic corrective disclosure.
Rather, the market sometimes absorbs information in pieces, if frauds are
slowly or partially revealed.
2. Indirect or Partial Disclosure: Materialization of the Risk
and “Leakage”
The lack of a specific corrective disclosure is not fatal to proof of loss
causation.315 Plaintiffs often argue that a risk materialized through

306. See Thorsen, supra note 70, at 101.
307. See id.
308. See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV-04-2147, 2008 WL 3072731, at *3–4
(D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008) (holding that a re-characterization of previously disclosed facts
could sometimes be corrective), rev’d and remanded, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th
Cir. June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011). But see In re Omnicom Grp., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511–13 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a recharacterization of
previously disclosed facts is not a corrective disclosure).
309. Courts differ in their characterizations of what types of disclosures constitute a
corrective disclosure. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 352, 363
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the paradigmatic corrective disclosure comes from the
issuer itself). Corrective disclosures are sometimes placed in a separate conceptual category
from “materialization of the risk.” See id. at 363 n.9, 366; see also In re Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. Sec. Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 148, 164–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that corrective
disclosures include all possible loss-inducing events). Other courts apparently disregard this
distinction. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that
materialization of the risk “is not a legal doctrine or anything special as a matter of fact”).
310. See Fox, supra note 20, at 865–66.
311. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 101.
312. See id.
313. 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). The case concerned the stock price of the issuer,
WCG. The market price had declined steadily, but coincided with the industry-wide market
for telecommunications stocks. See id. at 1132–34.
314. Id. at 1141. Consistent with ECMH, courts have rejected particular disclosures that
did not really include new information. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
315. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 102–03.
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staggered or partial disclosures; 316 when “the alleged misstatement conceals
a condition or event which then occurs and causes the plaintiff’s loss, it is
the materialization of the undisclosed condition or event that causes the
loss.” 317 This risk could materialize through adverse events other than—or
in addition to—corrective disclosures, including partial revelations of
wrongdoing. 318 Even if inflation dissipates gradually over a longer time
period, an investor is still damaged because he cannot recover the full
amount of inflation reflected in the security at the time of purchase.319
Thus, some argue that the gradual dissipation of inflation through a
“growing quiet awareness” of the fraud is a theory that warrants
recovery. 320
For example, plaintiffs have argued that concealed risks materialize when
a company announced poor financial results that are alleged to reveal the
company’s “true financial condition.”321 The In re Williams court required
the plaintiffs’ expert to establish proof of the mechanism by which the risk
materialized, and ultimately rejected this loss causation model. 322 As the
district court noted, materialization of the risk is a theory of proof, “not an
excuse for lack of evidence of loss causation.” 323 An expert must identify
when the materialization of the concealed risk occurred, and link that
materialization to the corresponding loss.324 Commentators note that where
316. See id.; see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 352, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
317. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“By contrast, where the alleged misstatement is an intentionally false opinion, the market
will not respond to the truth until the falsity is revealed—i.e. a corrective disclosure.”).
318. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 102–03 (noting that when journalists or analysts
remark on a corporation’s improprieties, the facts underlying these disclosures may fall
within a scheme of greater wrongdoing). Events such as earnings restatements or warnings
could substantiate this theory of loss causation. See id. at 102.
319. See id. at 103.
320. See Fox, supra note 20, at 851; Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 103.
321. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 102; see also In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG
Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2009). In In re Williams, the plaintiffs’ expert
attributed 98 percent of the value of the stock to the concealed fraud, and that the truth of the
company’s poor financial health was revealed to the market through “leakage.” Id. at 1134–
35.
322. The court held:
A plaintiff cannot simply state that the market had learned the truth by a certain
date and, because the learning was a gradual process, attribute all prior losses to
the revelation of the fraud. The inability to point to a single corrective disclosure
does not relieve the plaintiff of showing how the truth was revealed; he cannot say,
“Well, the market must have known.”
558 F.3d at 1138. Because the plaintiffs’ expert alleged that a trickle of information entered
into the marketplace over a nineteen-month period, the court quoted Dura for the proposition
that “[o]ther things being equal, the longer the time between the purchase and sale, the more
likely that . . . other factors caused the loss.” Id. at 1139 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 343).
323. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1265 (N.D. Okla. 2007), aff’d, 558
F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
324. The court also rejected bankruptcy as a corrective disclosure, since the zone of risk
within the misrepresentation “is not infinite.” In re Williams, 558 F.3d at 1142–43 (“[T]here
are simply too many potential intervening causes to say that bankruptcy was WCG’s legally
foreseeable destiny such that its trading price at bankruptcy equaled its true value . . . .”).
Sometimes, corporations reveal bundles of negative news on the same day. Courts reject
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a stock price declines gradually over a long period, a leakage theory might
enable plaintiffs to claim damages each day the stock price declined, since
they need not establish a concrete mechanism for market realization of the
truth. 325 Crafting a theory of causation becomes extremely difficult over
long class periods with many alleged misstatements.326
D. A Morass of Misstatements: Linking Damages Models
to Specific Misrepresentations
Class action plaintiffs often allege many fraudulent statements over long
class periods. 327
Multiple corrective disclosures complicate these
allegations, with inflation increasing after some misstatements, remaining
constant after others, and then gradually decreasing. 328 Calculations of
inflation are further complicated by different theories of disclosure for
multiple misstatements.329 Naturally, a jury can rule in either the
defendants’ or the plaintiffs’ favor for each misstatement. 330 An expert’s
carefully constructed inflation model can be undermined if the jury finds
that not all of the alleged misstatements are actionable.331 Hypothetically,
the plaintiffs’ expert could opine that the defendant’s stock price was
artificially inflated by the first misstatement, and a later misstatement
additionally inflated the stock. If the jury rules in the defendants’ favor on
one misstatement and in the plaintiffs’ favor on another, it is unclear
whether the inflation attributed to the first misstatement is wiped out, or if
the entire amount of inflation is transferred to the later misstatement.332
The few courts that have considered these issues have adopted a flexible
approach deferential to the jury’s findings. 333

expert analysis that does not disaggregate the negative news related to the fraud from news
unrelated to fraud. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp. Sec. Litig., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011
WL 1585605, at *21–22 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011); see also infra note 337 and
accompanying text.
325. Pietrzak & McLaughlin, supra note 23.
326. See infra Part III.D.
327. The PSLRA requires that plaintiffs specify each misleading statement for which they
seek relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Burch, supra note 15, at 357.
328. See supra Part III.A; infra Part III.E.
329. See supra Part III.C.
330. See Daniel H. Gold, Loss Causation at the Proof Stage 5 Years After Dura, 29 SEC.
REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 5, 11 (2010).
331. See id.
332. Id.
333. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (citing Castillo v. Envoy Corp., 206 F.R.D. 464, 472 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)) (noting that
where plaintiffs’ inflation band did not correspond directly to fifty-seven misstatements,
“courts have suggested that a misstatement may cause inflation simply by maintaining
existing market expectations, even if it does not actually cause the inflation in the stock price
to increase on the day the statement is made”).
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E. Lost at Sea? Three Recent Verdicts
Few securities class actions ever see trial, and even fewer reach a jury
verdict. 334 This Note focuses on three recent verdicts in securities class
actions that have important loss causation implications. 335 The federal
courts have a long history of according great deference to jury verdicts,336
but these juries’ findings did not logically follow the parties’ evidence of
causation and damages. 337
1. The Household Verdict
Beginning in August 2002, individual plaintiffs filed a series of
complaints against Household International, Inc. and several of its officers,
among others. 338 Household was a publicly traded corporation in the
business of consumer lending. 339 Those complaints alleged that Household

334. See Savett, supra note 25; see also Peter Lattman, A Rare Species: The SecuritiesFraud Class-Action Trial, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007, 3:07 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/10/24/a-rare-species-the-securities-fraud-class-action-trial/.
335. These three verdicts could ultimately yield billions of dollars in damages. See
Andrew M. Harris, HSBC Faces Fraud Trial over Predecessor’s Lending (Update2),
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2009, 6:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aXGHk_IncBoQ; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
336. See Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (“Courts are
not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could
have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are
more reasonable.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50; Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518–19
(1995) (“A jury verdict expresses a collective judgment that we may fairly presume to reflect
the considered view of the community.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. A fourth class action, In re BankAtlantic Bancorp. Securities Litigation, reached a
jury verdict in November 2010, following four weeks of trial. No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL
1585605, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011). The jury found some defendants liable for some,
but not all, of the alleged misstatements. See id. On April 25, 2011, the court vacated the
verdict, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to prove loss
causation. See id. at *14–22. The crux of the defendants’ post-trial arguments concerned
testimony by the plaintiffs’ expert related to causation and damages. See id.; see also id. at
*4 (quoting defendants’ argument that “[t]his is a case based on [the plaintiffs’ expert’s]
broad-brush assumptions”). The plaintiffs proceeded on a materialization-of-the-risk theory,
and the jury found for liability on one of two possible damages periods. See id. at *6, *15–
16. The verdict—and therefore the court’s resolution of the defendants’ post-trial motion—
“hinged” on the jury’s finding regarding the release of a bundle of negative information on
the materialization date. Id. at *18–19. However, that negative information pertained to both
fraud-related and non-fraudulent conduct. Id. at *18. At trial, the plaintiffs’ expert “freely
admitted” that she assumed that the entire negative bundle related to the fraud. Id. at *19.
She did not disaggregate the effect of the negative fraud-related information from the effect
of the non-fraudulent information. Id. Because the jury rejected the plaintiffs’ assumption,
its findings were necessarily fatal to proof of causation, and the court vacated the jury’s
findings of liability for this period of damages. See id. at *21. Though this decision
articulated some of the problems with proof of causation, this Note focuses on three other
verdicts. In those three verdicts, juries applied causation models over longer time periods,
decided many more misstatements than those at issue in In re BankAtlantic, or made findings
of fact utterly inconsistent with the economic theory supporting the courts’ causation and
damages jurisprudence.
338. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 5893, 2004
WL 574665, at *1, *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2004).
339. See id. at *2.
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violated the federal securities laws by failing to report that it manipulated
delinquent loans to appear solvent, and that it engaged in predatory
lending. 340 After Household’s auditors recommended that it significantly
restate its earnings, and news of a possible state class action settlement
became public, the plaintiffs filed suit.341 The court certified the class in
2004 342 and the matter ultimately went to trial.
On May 7, 2009, the jury returned a mixed verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs. 343 The jury found Household liable for seventeen of a total of
forty alleged misstatements, exonerating all the defendants on the first
thirteen misstatements and deciding per-day, per-share dollar inflation for
each day of the class period. 344 Loss causation was a heavily litigated issue
in the case, and it featured prominently in the parties’ post-trial
submissions. 345
After the verdict, Household moved for judgment as a matter of law.346
The verdict form required the jury to select a model of loss causation
proffered by the plaintiffs’ expert that “reasonably estimate[d]” damages, if
it found the defendants liable for any of the misstatements. 347 The jury
selected the leakage model, 348 and found no share price inflation until the
date of the first misstatement for which they determined the defendants
liable, March 23, 2001. 349 On that date, however, the jury attributed the
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 5893, 2006
WL 1120522, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2006).
343. See Verdict Form, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02
Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009), ECF No. 1611 [hereinafter Household Verdict Form];
LaCroix, supra note 26. This trial was only the seventh securities class action based on postPSLRA conduct to reach a verdict. See Savett, supra note 25. The action proceeded to a
second phase for determination of damages and individual reliance issues. See Lawrence E.
Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
344. See Household Verdict Form, supra note 343, at 1–40; id. tbl.B.; LaCroix, supra
note 26.
345. See Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motions for
Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rule 50(b) or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial
Pursuant to Rule 59 at 4–14, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02
Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2009), ECF No. 1650 [hereinafter Household Rule 50 Motion];
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to
Rule 50(b) or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 at 3–12, Lawrence E.
Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2009), ECF
No. 1656 [hereinafter Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion].
346. See Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a), the court may order judgment as a matter of law after a party has been fully
heard on an issue if the court finds that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). If the court
does not grant a Rule 50(a) motion, the party requesting judgment as a matter of law may
renew their motion following a verdict. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
347. See Household Verdict Form, supra note 343, at 41 (“[W]rite the amount of loss per
share, if any, that, according to the model you have chosen, any defendant’s conduct caused
plaintiffs to suffer on each of the dates . . . .”).
348. Id. The jury declined to select a specific disclosures model put forth by the
plaintiffs’ expert. See id.
349. See id. at 11, 41 & tbl.B (no inflation determined until March 23, 2001, the date of
the first misstatement).
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highest amount of inflation claimed by the plaintiffs’ expert throughout the
class period, even though the plaintiffs’ expert opined that the March 23,
2001 misstatement only inflated the share price by 67 cents. 350 Essentially,
the jury found the maximum amount of inflation present in Household’s
stock at the start of liability. 351 The jury found that following March 23,
2001, inflation floated between negative $4.66 and $23.94 per share.352
In its Rule 50 motion, Household attacked these findings, arguing that the
plaintiffs’ leakage theory was legally defective.353 Because the plaintiffs
argued that Household’s stock price declined as a result of information
trickling into the market, rather than through a corrective disclosure, the
plaintiffs’ damages model could not identify the mechanism for revealing
the truth.354 If it could not identify this mechanism, it necessarily could not
disaggregate confounding factors, and thus could not prove loss
causation. 355 Perhaps more importantly, Household argued that the
plaintiffs’ purported failure to identify a disclosure mechanism could not
prove loss causation because there was no proof that the stock price
declines were tied to an earlier misstatement.356 In other words, even if the
leaked information caused the price drops, the plaintiffs introduced no
evidence describing exactly what was revealed.357
Household also argued that the jury verdict was irreconcilably
inconsistent because the jury found that share price inflation actually
increased on days where there was no misstatement. 358 Moreover, the
defendants objected to the verdict form, which did not require the jury to
decide which specific elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim were satisfied for
each misstatement. 359
350. See Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 8, 9, 11 (noting
that plaintiffs’ expert “capped” the quantification to the cumulative residual price decline of
$23.94); see also id. at 9 n.8 (noting that even though there was no identifiable news during
one interval in the class period, “inflation declines . . . because of leakage which dissipates
inflation”); Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 11–12, 29–30 (arguing on
materiality grounds that the jury’s verdict is fatally inconsistent because fourteen of the
misstatements for which defendants were found liable—out of a total of seventeen—caused
no new inflation in the share price).
351. See Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 8; Household
Verdict Form, supra note 343, tbl.B.
352. See Household Verdict Form, supra note 343, tbl.B. Inflation remained constant
until September 6, 2001, then oscillated. See id. “Negative” inflation occurred beginning in
September 2002. See id. Inflation returned to zero dollars on the final day of the class
period. See id.; see also LaCroix, supra note 26 (noting that “[n]egative share inflation is a
puzzling concept that . . . will have to be sorted out”).
353. See Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 6–10. Defendants relied on the
court’s opinion in In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1266–67 (N.D. Okla.
2007), aff’d, 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009), discussed supra Part III.C.
354. See Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 5.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 8–10.
357. See id.
358. See id. at 30.
359. See id. at 60–61 (arguing that the legal standard would be better served “by having
the jury expressly address the predicate loss causation element . . . before turning to the
ultimate question of liability”).
According to Household, the verdict “produced
unintelligible findings of liability coupled with zero or negative inflation.” Id. at 61.
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For their part, the plaintiffs resisted these arguments on the grounds that
Dura does not require a specific “parsing exercise” between theories of
liability and inflation; the plaintiffs argued that the jury need not match
inflation exactly to an expert’s suggested amount; and that the defendants
waived their objections by failing to request subsequent jury deliberations
to clarify the alleged defects in the verdict form. 360 The court struck
Household’s motion pending the damages phase of the trial.361 To date, the
court has not entered a final judgment.
2. The Vivendi Verdict
In 2002, shareholders of Vivendi Universal, S.A. sued the corporation
and several of its officers, alleging that Vivendi violated the federal
securities laws, including Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act. 362 The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants misrepresented Vivendi’s liquidity condition
during a class period stretching from October 2000 to August 2002.363 The
court certified the matter as a class action in 2007, and trial began in
October 2009. 364
Following a three-month trial, the jury returned its verdict on January 29,
2010. 365 The jury found Vivendi liable for all fifty-seven alleged
misstatements. 366 As in Household, the jury determined inflation on a daily
per-share basis across the entire class period of approximately 400 days. 367
Vivendi challenged the plaintiffs’ proof of loss causation in a post-trial
motion. 368
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that Vivendi concealed its risk of a liquidity
crisis, and the plaintiffs’ expert opined that those risks materialized over
nine days during the class period. 369 Those events were primarily
360. See Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 12.
361. Notification of Docket Entry at 1, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household
Int’l, Inc., 02 Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2010), ECF No. 1696.
362. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
363. See id.; see also id. at 537–43 (detailing the evidence supporting defendants’
misrepresentations of its liquidity condition); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634
F. Supp. 2d 352, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on loss causation).
364. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23.
365. See id. at 520–21; Verdict Form, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02
Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010), ECF No. 998 [hereinafter Vivendi Verdict Form];
Koppel, supra note 26.
366. See Vivendi Verdict Form, supra note 365, at 1–57. The jury attributed no liability
to the co-defendants. See id. at 69.
367. See id. at 58-68. Unlike in Household, the Vivendi verdict form required jurors to
find that the plaintiffs proved each element of their Section 10(b) claims for each of the fiftyseven misstatements. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
368. See Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Support of Vivendi, S.A.’s Renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rule 50(b), or, in the Alternative, for a
New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 26–42, In re
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010), ECF No.
1022 [hereinafter, Vivendi Rule 50 Motion]; see also supra note 346 and accompanying text
(discussing the standard of review of post-trial motions).
369. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 556.

2011]

TIMING IS EVERYTHING

915

unexpected asset sales or downgrades of Vivendi’s debt by the ratings
agencies. 370 Rather than conducting an event study to ascertain what
disclosures inflated the value of the security, the plaintiffs’ event study
examined the gradual materialization of the fraud over those nine dates.371
The defendants introduced evidence that the market was aware of the
information released on those dates, so the price drops on the nine
materialization dates that purportedly revealed the fraud could not be
attributable to the disclosures. 372 This is an application of the “truth on the
market” doctrine; if disclosures reveal old news, they cannot impact the
market price of the security or cause any losses. 373 The defendants
introduced evidence that the market knew of Vivendi’s poor cash flow, high
debt load, and other liquidity risks prior to the materialization dates in
2002. 374 Additionally, the defendants sought to rebut the plaintiffs’
evidence with testimony that the plaintiffs’ expert did not conduct a proper
event study, and that the losses on the materialization dates did not
correspond to the revelation of the fraud, but to unrelated industry-wide or
market-wide declines. 375 Thus, this “counter-event” study sought to
identify superseding causes that would stifle the plaintiffs’ Dura analysis.
The trial’s causation issues related to the jury’s damage findings. The
plaintiffs submitted daily calculations of per-share damages to the jury.376
The jury’s ultimate findings roughly halved the amount of inflation
proffered by the plaintiffs’ expert.377 For example, the jury found that there
was per-share inflation of €2.40 on September 10, 2001, then again on
October 1, 2001. 378 Interestingly, the jury found that there was zero stock
price inflation between those dates,379 yet there was no intervening
370. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 586, 601 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
371. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
372. See Transcript of Trial at 6521:12–6522:19, 6531:8–6542:17, In re Vivendi
Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Vivendi Trial
Transcript] (testimony of Ronald Gilson).
373. See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2000).
374. See Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 6521:12–6522:19, 6531:8–6542:17
(testimony of Ronald Gilson).
375. See Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 6264:16–6266:25, 6267:1–25,
6274:17–6275:19 (testimony of William Silber). The defendants’ expert conducted his own
event study, and then testified that the plaintiffs did not “separate out the alleged
misrepresentations from other news,” thus returning an incorrect measure of inflation. See
Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 6264:16–6266:25, 6274:17–6275:19 (testimony
of William Silber) (testifying that plaintiffs’ expert, among other things, did not use a proper
control period or a correct measure of volatility).
376. See Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 7437:17–7438:20; Vivendi Verdict
Form, supra note 365, at 58–68.
377. See In re Vivendi 765 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
378. See Vivendi Verdict Form, supra note 365, at 63.
379. See id.; see also Vivendi Rule 50 Motion, supra note 368, at 30 n.23. In its Rule 50
motion, Vivendi argued that since inflation returned to zero on September 11, 2001, the class
period must end on that date. See id. at 26–29 (arguing that Vivendi’s lone concealed risk—a
liquidity crisis—was fully known to the market since, according to the jury’s findings of
fact, inflation returned to zero on eight separate dates during the class period). Vivendi also
put forth arguments that the plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the
Second Circuit’s “zone of risk” test as articulated in In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Securities
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disclosure. 380 Effectively, a class member who purchased Vivendi stock on
September 10, 2001 and then sold before October 1, 2001 was damaged by
fraud, even though there was no event that would trigger the dissipation. 381
Vivendi argued that this “compromise” verdict was impermissible, and
demanded a new trial. 382
On February 17, 2011, the district court largely denied Vivendi’s Rule 50
motion, rejecting the defendants’ loss causation arguments.383 In its
decision, the court held that a reasonable juror could have concluded that
the fraud materialized on the nine dates proffered by the plaintiffs. 384 The
court noted that the concealed risks were reasonably remote to those who
believed the fraud; for example, the plaintiffs put forth evidence that certain
materialization events “surprised” market analysts. 385 The matter is still
pending final judgment, though Vivendi has indicated that it will appeal. 386
3. The Apollo Verdict
A third class action, In re Apollo Group, Inc. Securities Litigation,387
reached a jury verdict on January 16, 2008. 388 Apollo Group, Inc. is the
parent company of the University of Phoenix, a for-profit university. 389
The plaintiffs alleged that Apollo made misstatements related to an
investigation by the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) into the
University of Phoenix’s possible violations of DOE regulations.390 The
district court eventually overturned the verdict because the facts of the
alleged corrective disclosure, an analyst report dealing with the DOE
investigation, had previously been disclosed in articles in the Wall Street
Journal and the Chicago Tribune discussing the contents of a DOE
report. 391 Apollo’s stock price had not reacted to the prior news articles,
Litigation, 597 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2010). See Vivendi Rule 50 Motion, supra note 368,
at 31–39. The court ultimately rejected Vivendi’s arguments. See In re Vivendi, 765
F. Supp. 2d at 563–67.
380. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 564–65.
381. Cf. id. As a corollary, purchasers who bought between September 10 and 29 would
theoretically have no damages at all, since they did not buy artificially inflated shares (even
though the markets closed for some of the period following the 9/11 attacks).
382. Vivendi Rule 50 Motion, supra note 368, at 45–46 (arguing that the jury was
“completely at sea” when it made its “compromise” loss causation findings and citing cases
reversing compromise jury verdicts that have no basis in the evidence).
383. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d 512.
384. See id. at 560–61.
385. See id. at 556–57.
386. See Press Release, Vivendi, S.A., Vivendi Will Appeal to Overturn Jury Verdict
(Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/Vivendi-Will-Appeal-toOverturn.
387. No. CV-04-2147, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d and
remanded, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
388. See Transcript of Trial at 4111:16–4120:14, In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
CV-04-2147, 2008 WL 3072731 (D. Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).
389. See In re Apollo, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1.
390. See id.
391. See id. at *3–4 (noting the rarity of a situation where the corrective facts are
“obfuscated in such a way, or are of such complexity, as to require someone to connect the
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and only suffered a statistically significant price drop after publication of
the analyst report. 392 In overturning the verdict, the district court held that
since the analyst report contained no new information, it could not be
corrective. 393 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and
restored the jury verdict.394 Apollo petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari to consider whether liability for a stock price decline that occurred
a week after the news first became public was consistent with the
presumption of an efficient market underlying FOTM cases, 395 and whether
the analyst report, as a re-characterization of previously disclosed facts,
could constitute a corrective disclosure.396 This presented the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to resolve the longstanding tension between the
economic theory that facilitated class actions and theories of causation, and
the common law principles born out of a different era of litigation. The
Supreme Court declined this opportunity. On March 7, 2011, the Court
denied certiorari, leaving the standard of proof of loss causation open to the
lower federal courts. 397
IV. THE INQUIRY, COLLAPSED: THE COURTS MUST DEVELOP RULES FOR
PROOF OF LOSS CAUSATION
The Household, Vivendi, and Apollo verdicts illustrate unique issues of
loss causation. Those trials produced mountains of evidence, competing
experts, and, most likely, confused juries. Given the conceptual complexity
of loss causation, the losing parties will invariably move for post-trial relief.
This Note suggests that courts should develop anticipatory bright-line rules
to deal with post-trial challenges to jury findings of causation and damages.
These trials have incredible economic consequences, 398 and the courts
should adopt causation rules that are more consistent with economic theory.
Courts have historically accorded great deference to jury verdicts, so it is
perhaps not surprising that jury findings are rarely disturbed. The results of
all three of these trials, however, compel courts to find, as a matter of law,
that there is no loss causation without an identifiable mechanism for
disclosure that is quickly absorbed by the market, and that is connected to
dots for a bewildered market” but holding that a re-characterization of previously disclosed
facts could sometimes be corrective). But see In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d
501, 512 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A negative journalistic characterization of previously disclosed
facts does not constitute a corrective disclosure . . . .”).
392. See In re Apollo, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1.
393. See id. at *3–4.
394. See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988, at *1 (9th
Cir. June 23, 2010) (holding that a reasonable juror could have concluded that the challenged
analyst reports were corrective disclosures).
395. The Basic Inc. v. Levinson Court explicitly declined to address this issue. See 485
U.S. 224, 248 n.28 (1988); supra note 181 and accompanying text.
396. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at *i (arguing that a circuit split
exists on the issue of the immediacy of market reaction to a disclosure as well as to whether
a re-characterization of previously disclosed facts constitutes a corrective disclosure).
397. Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011)
(denying certiorari).
398. See supra notes 13, 26 and accompanying text.
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earlier misstatements. Consistent with the purposes of the securities laws,
with the FOTM theory, and with the benefit of hindsight following three
confused verdicts, this Note encourages the courts to tighten the causation
standard.
A. Unpredictable Liability Does Not Serve the Legislative Goals of the
Securities Laws
If one of the legislative purposes of the securities laws is transparency,
the overriding goal of the Rule 10b-5 suit must be deterrence.399
Accordingly, the law should create rules that provide a reliable measure of
liability for market participants. 400 By definition, unpredictable liability
does nothing to deter corporate mischief.401 In Vivendi and Household, the
juries’ findings of share price inflation on a per-day basis did not match the
evidence adduced at trial.402 The juries determined that the defendants
made actionable misrepresentations, and were therefore liable, but the
difficulties inherent in linking specific misstatements to inflation resulted in
chaotic verdicts.403 The Supreme Court’s landmark Dura decision requires
the plaintiffs to prove that a material misstatement inflated the market value
of a security, thereby tainting the investment with fraud.404 The loss
occurs, if at all, when the market learns the truth about the material
misstatement; the market quickly absorbs that information and investors
bear the corresponding loss. 405 The securities laws protect investors from
fraud, and do not exist to insure investors from all loss. 406
These verdicts, though they may ultimately yield billions of dollars in
damages for shareholders, 407 exonerate defendants of some misconduct, but
impose liability for statements they never made. 408 A plaintiff’s verdict
may provide redress for some aggrieved shareholders, but complex cases
require more detailed findings, and the results of these recent trials will not
entirely dissuade future wrongdoers. 409 The courts must fashion rules that
strengthen the logical connection between liability and measurable loss to
prevent further irrational verdicts; in short, the courts must effect
conceptual clarity. They can accomplish this by designing a rule requiring
that specific alleged misstatements are linked to a later loss caused by an
identifiable disclosure mechanism. 410 This solution can be extrapolated
399. See supra notes 64, 229 and accompanying text.
400. See Burch, supra note 15, at 380–86; supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part III.E.1–2.
403. See supra Part III.E.1–2; note 382 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
405. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010); see also supra notes
104, 210, 266–71 and accompanying text.
406. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).
407. See supra notes 26, 335 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 350–58 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 350–58 and accompanying text.
410. See Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 842–
43 (7th Cir. 2007) (causation must be applied on a statement-by-statement basis); supra Parts
II.C, III.C–D.
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from the economic theory that currently dominates class actions and is
premised on the market’s rapid absorption of information. 411
B. The Bearer of Bad News? The Market Proves Loss Causation
The modern approach to loss causation depends in large part on the
definition of a security’s value. 412 In Dura, the Court held that at the
instant of purchase, a stock’s value is equal to its market price.413 Because
an investor can simply pass the inflation along to another buyer, there has
been no economic loss. 414
FOTM bridges loss causation and reliance, but the two elements remain
conceptually distinct.415 If securities are purchased in an efficient market,
the investor assumes that the market has accounted for all available public
information concerning the issuer, and that the price represents the
security’s integral value.416 Where an issuer disseminates a misstatement,
the entire market is fooled until the information is later corrected. 417
Putative class action plaintiffs seeking certification typically assert the
FOTM theory that the Supreme Court upheld in Basic. 418 But in Apollo,
the Ninth Circuit restored a jury verdict that is likely inconsistent with both
Basic and Dura. 419 In Apollo, the defendant’s stock price did not react to
corrective information published in prominent national newspapers, but
instead reacted a week later when an analyst published an unflattering
report. 420 The market need not be omniscient, but it rapidly digests all
public information. 421 In Apollo, the market’s initial apathy to the
newspaper report suggests that there was no loss causation as a matter of
law. 422 The drop in Apollo’s share price occurred much later, only after a
recharacterization of the old news.423 Dura requires a causal connection
411. See supra Parts I.C–D.
412. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 255 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
the Court’s opinion “implicitly suggests that stocks have some ‘true value’ that is
measurable by a standard other than their market price”).
413. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342; supra Part II.C.
414. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342; supra Part II.C.
415. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011); In re
Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509–10 (2d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing
between different types of loss causation); supra Parts I.C, II.A.
416. See supra Part II.A. The market conducts the valuation of the security that the
investor in a face-to-face transaction normally would. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 244 (1988) (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980))
(noting the agency role the market plays for the investor). Implicit in this judgment is an
assumption that the integrity of the share price is not clouded by fraud. See id. at 245.
417. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text.
419. See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir.
June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
420. See supra notes 390–94 and accompanying text.
421. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1601–02 (1991);
Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192; supra note 268 and accompanying text.
422. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at *24–30; see also supra Part
II.A; supra note 177 (discussing the Cammer factors).
423. See supra notes 389–93 and accompanying text.
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between the misstatement, the revelation of the concealed fraud, and the
loss. Because only new information can cause a loss, the intervening
newspaper reports severed the chain of causation between the misstatement
and the purported corrective disclosure, the analyst report.424 This is
necessarily fatal to the plaintiff’s proof of loss causation.
The jury findings in Vivendi and Household suggest a similar
conclusion. 425 Without proof of some mechanism that created or revealed
the fraud, 426 inflation or dissipation that is not tied to a disclosure is
inconsistent with a central tenet of ECMH: share prices do not arbitrarily
respond to news. 427 The juries’ random inflation findings, coupled with the
plaintiffs’ leakage model that did not identify disclosure mechanisms or tie
the loss to earlier misstatements, strongly supports a conclusion that there
was no proof of loss causation. 428 To avoid incongruous results, courts
should require plaintiffs to bear the burden of disaggregating superseding
causes and identify the mechanism that alerted the market to defendants’
fraud. Because disputed issues of fact are ultimately decided by the jury,
the courts should continue to develop anticipatory rules for considering
post-trial motions.
C. Modern Theory and the Common Law: The Elements of a Rule 10b-5
Suit Are Inextricable
In the market model of a securities class action, materiality, loss
causation, reliance, and damages collapse into the same issue: the amount
of inflation that a misrepresentation causes in the market price of a security,
and the amount of dissipation that occurs once the market learns the
truth. 429 Courts first used the common law to fill the gaps in Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence, but soon realized that these principles were not entirely
adequate to facilitate modern remedies.430 The courts needed more
practical measures to cope with procedural requirements that might
otherwise make recovery unavailable to aggrieved parties.431
The unique nature of open-market transactions conducted over large,
impersonal exchanges, and the special requirements for class action suits,
forced the courts to apply an economic analysis clothed in the language of

424. See supra notes 126 and accompanying text.
425. See supra Part III.E.1–2.
426. See supra notes 321–24 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
428. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511–12 (2d Cir. 2010);
supra Part I.B. FOTM made it much easier to maintain a class action, but it should require
almost instant market reaction to news. See supra Parts I.D, II.A, notes 177, 424 and
accompanying text. In other words, “the market cannot be efficient for purposes of
assimilating a defendants’ fraud immediately into price, and then lazy and unresponsive
when that fraud is revealed.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at *26–27.
429. See Fisher, supra note 290, at 878; Fox, supra note 20, at 845; supra note 259 and
accompanying text.
430. See supra Part II.A, notes 9, 106–12 and accompanying text.
431. See supra Parts II.A, II.C, note 150 and accompanying text.
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common law deceit. 432 The necessity to provide an avenue of redress on a
mass scale resulted in the courts’ endorsement of economic theory. 433
The conflicts between common law fraud and modern securities fraud
actions continue with loss causation. 434 The bifurcation of transaction and
loss causation, for example, is a modern policy invention that was first
devised to limit liability. 435 The Basic decision permitted the lower courts
to apply FOTM to create a presumption of reliance; now, the courts can
also opt to alter the common law proximate cause analogy, which enabled
broader theories of loss causation, to remain consistent with the ECMH. 436
The Dura Court did not have the benefit of hindsight, and judicial
restraint urged a limited holding. 437 However, three recent verdicts may
force defendants to pay out damages for phantom losses that have little or
no connection to actual misconduct; on the flip side, these verdicts may also
deprive investors of their rightful share of damages. 438 The mechanisms for
market realization of the truth remain nebulous, clouding these findings.439
The common law is not well suited to cope with the modern policy issues
underlying complex litigation.440 Dura counseled the courts to look to
causation in deceit actions for guidance, but the common law has very
apparent limitations. 441 The intrinsic differences between traditional
reliance and the economic theory supporting the FOTM presumption are
not easily reconciled. 442 Because the results in the three illustrative trials
do not comport with ECMH, the failure to align losses with a revelation of
the truth tied to an initial misstatement is fatal.
Loss causation has served well as both a measure of plaintiffs’ injury and
as a gatekeeping mechanism, but it has not always done so at the proof
stage. 443 If it is to be useful at all, FOTM should be available for both
plaintiffs and defendants at the class certification and proof stages, to
432. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; supra Parts II.A, II.C.
433. See supra Part II.A.
434. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 76–79, 195 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts I.B, III.C
(discussing different theories of loss causation).
437. See Fox, supra note 20, at 846; Gillespie, supra note 203, at 172.
438. See supra Part III.E; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why
the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533,
533–34 (2005) (published prior to Dura and describing the windfall purchase price inflation
provides to plaintiffs).
439. See supra Part III.E.
440. See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text. But see Fisch, supra note 73, at
813–14.
441. See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.D (discussing
the class action mechanism of aggregation of claims).
442. See supra Part I.B.
443. See supra Part III. Causation issues plagued yet another trial; most recently, a
district court set aside a jury verdict on loss causation grounds. See In re BankAtlantic
Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25,
2011) (holding that plaintiffs may prove loss causation “only by producing the testimony of
an expert who has completed a reliable multiple-regression analysis, event study, and
financial analysis in order to quantify the extent to which the claimed losses are the result of
the alleged fraud”); see also supra note 337 (discussing this verdict).
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demonstrate materiality, causation, and damages. Any other result would
produce inconsistency, irrationality, and unfairness. The courts should
intervene to uphold the purposes of the securities laws through closer
adherence to the economic theories that enabled the modern class action, as
well as to protect the rule of law set by the Supreme Court in Basic and
Dura.
CONCLUSION
This Note attempts to shed some light on one of the most difficult
conceptual issues in securities litigation. In Basic and Dura, and more
recently in Halliburton, the Court painstakingly developed a framework for
loss causation. Not surprisingly, causation became hotly contested, and
litigants incurred substantial costs as a result. This Note does not propose a
complete overhaul of a highly complex doctrine, but it does encourage the
courts to establish consistency by tightening the causation standard to
match the careful guidance set forth by the Supreme Court, in tandem with
the economic underpinnings of securities class actions. By establishing
bright-line rules for post-trial review, the courts will ensure that the parties
have met their burden of proving loss causation.

